Amendments to the Companies Act make it easier to prosecute delinquent board members:
The Companies Second Amendment Act 17 of 2024 became effective on 27 December 2024, amending the provisions relating to director and officer liability and delinquency.
These amendments follow recommendations made by the Zondo state capture commission and aim to address some of the actions needed for South Africa to exit the Financial Action Task Force greylist.
The Zondo commission highlighted the fact that it often “takes years for the facts of delinquency, especially in [state-owned entities] to be uncovered”. Accordingly, the commission recommended that the Companies Act 71 of 2008 (Companies Act) be amended to extend the time period within which applications for declarations of delinquency may be brought so that “steps can still be taken by the executive authority of a state-owned enterprise to ensure that [delinquent directors] are declared delinquent and thereby prevented from serving on the boards of companies”.
The changes
The first change means that, on good cause shown, the period to institute a claim for loss or damages under section 77 of the Companies Act, which outlines director and officer liability, can now be extended by a court beyond the existing three-year period.
The second change concerns amendments to section 162 of the Act, which previously stipulated that an application to declare a director delinquent could be instituted against a person who is currently a director, or was a director, of a particular company within two years preceding the application.
As a result of the second change, the period to declare a director delinquent or under probation has now been extended from two years to five years after that person ceases to be a director, or a longer period determined by a court on good cause shown (which extension was not previously possible).
The second change means that even where a director is no longer serving on the board of the relevant company, they can still face a delinquency application if such application is brought within five years of the termination of their service on the board.
Amendments to legislation do not usually apply retrospectively but the changes to these sections specifically provide for the retrospective application of these amendments.
Reasons for the changes
Delinquency refers to instances where a director’s conduct falls within the grounds specified in section 162(5) of the Companies Act, which includes them acting unlawfully, negligently or in a manner that breaches their fiduciary duties; in a way that prejudices the company, its shareholders or creditors or is grossly abusive, reckless or in flagrant disregard of the law or the company’s interests.
The Companies Act and the common law prescribe the standard of conduct for directors when executing their duties as such. Failure to uphold these standards can result in personal liability and statutory consequences being imposed on them. This includes being declared delinquent.
In recent years, there have been several high-profile instances of applicants seeking director delinquency orders in South Africa, particularly in the wake of corporate and state capture scandals. These cases have highlighted the need for stricter enforcement of the Companies Act and for greater accountability among company directors.
The Act has a clear mechanism to root out directors who do not conduct themselves in accordance with the required legal standards and to ensure that individuals, who have proved through their failure to adhere to the required standards of probity and care that they should not hold positions of authority and trust, are prevented from serving as directors in any company.
Extending the time period within which to bring director liability and delinquency claims assists in ensuring that directors are held accountable for their actions. Further, the amendments’ retrospective application means that they also apply to past actions, so historical misconduct can be addressed.
The overarching objective of these remedies of director and officer liability and delinquency is to safeguard organisations, investors and South Africa from future maladministration and corruption.
Steps to avoid director delinquency
To mitigate the risk of delinquent director cases, businesses should ensure that:
- A proper due diligence is conducted on a prospective director before their appointment, including confirming that they are not disqualified or ineligible from being a director in terms of section 69 and 70 of the Companies Act;
- At the start of the tenure of a directorship, the director signs and agrees to abide by the board’s code of conduct, which should clearly set out the standard of conduct expected;
- Directors have declared any conflict of interest in writing upon appointment. This should be reviewed annually and updated. Further, at the start of each board meeting, a declaration of interests should be a standing agenda item and should be minuted;
- Adequate training is offered to directors so that they understand their fiduciary duties, roles and responsibilities and corporate governance best practice;
- The company minutes and other records are properly and accurately kept in respect of discussions, decisions and actions conducted by directors; and
- Comprehensive directors’ and officers’ liability insurance is in place.
Should a business decide to pursue a delinquency application, it should start by gathering comprehensive evidence, removing the director from the board and seeking legal advice.
The December 2024 amendments to the time period within which to bring director liability and delinquency claims are to be welcomed as part of a broader effort to guarantee a transparent and robust business environment that supports good governance, ethical business standards, investment and sustainable growth.
Vanessa Jacklin-Levin and Daniel Pretorius are partners at Bowmans South Africa and Thomas Erskine is a candidate legal practitioner.
Ithala has R300 million ring-fenced to secure deposits, says KZN treasury:
Ithala SOC has R300 million ring-fenced in the provincial revenue fund that can be used by the bank to secure deposits — as required by the South African Reserve Bank’s Prudential Authority — the KwaZulu-Natal treasury has said in court papers.
The money is not reflected in Ithala’s balance sheet because it hasn’t been advanced to the bank, according to a supporting affidavit deposed by the KwaZulu-Natal treasury head of department, Carol Lyn Coetzee.
The affidavit was filed last week.
“This is additional capital available to Ithala that can be drawn for purposes of security deposits held by Ithala as was required by the Prudential Authority in the final authority,” Coetzee said.
The bank was supposed to be in the Pietermaritzburg high court on Tuesday to challenge what it says are unfair legal instructions from Johannes Kruger, the Repayment Administrator of the PA.
The legal instructions have frozen all activity on Ithala’s accounts, making it impossible for the bank to operate. Staff have not been paid their January salaries.
In a statement announcing the postponement of Tuesday’s hearing on Monday afternoon, KZN finance MEC Francois Rodgers said: “This matter requires urgent attention as it concerns the livelihoods of thousands of people in KwaZulu-Natal.
“Sassa beneficiaries who depend on Ithala are in limbo. At least 10 000 government employees (who bank with Ithala and could not draw their paid salaries) did not receive their salaries in January after Mr. Johannes Kruger, who is the RA, instructed Ithala to stop all transactions.
“Ithala’s own employees did not receive their January salaries and if there’s no urgent intervention, they will also not receive their February salaries in time. The judiciary must be sensitive to these realities,” said Rodgers.
The bank is set to be in the same court on Thursday to oppose an application by the Prudential Authority for provisional liquidation of the entity. Ithala will be supported by the provincial treasury and KwaZulu-Natal’s department of economic development in this matter.
Should the Prudential Authority be granted the provisional liquidation, it will result in the closure of 257 000 depositors’ accounts as the matter plays out. Should the bank close, 400 jobs could be lost.
Ithala is looking for a transferee bank, on whose licence it can piggy-back, to continue operations.
The bank has been a lifeline for KwaZulu-Natal’s rural economy for more than three decades.
Falling under the province’s economic development department, it has played a pivotal role in providing development finance to small and medium enterprises, as well as essential banking and insurance services to those in the rural areas.
Its collapse would deliver a devastating blow to its clients in the province’s rural heartlands and urban centres.
The loss would also severely undermine KwaZulu-Natal’s developmental agenda, which depends on institutions like Ithala to drive inclusive economic growth.
The Prudential Authority has said liquidation is in the best interests of depositors, given that according to repayment administrator Kruger, Ithala is technically and legally insolvent.
The authority’s stance follows the expiration of Ithala’s exemption from the Banks Act in December 2023, which allowed it to operate without a banking licence.
Kruger has been accused of attempting to take sweeping control of Ithala’s operations, drawing sharp criticism from KwaZulu-Natal provincial officials.
In November last year, Ithala won a court case against him, with costs, to return control of Ithala’s non-banking assets and operations, saying he had overstepped his mandate and had usurped the authority of the SOC’s board and management. It is this ruling that Ithala was to ask the court to enforce on Tuesday.
Kruger, a partner at Bowman Gilfillan Attorneys, has also faced allegations of conflict of interest. According to the affidavit, he continues to use his law firm in litigation against Ithala, raising questions about his impartiality.
“The repayment administrator … has issued a directive that Ithala must repay all deposits held by it in the amount R2.47 billion into his firm’s trust account,” the affidavit reads.
Kruger’s approach has been criticised as disproportionately punitive, with provincial officials accusing him of treating Ithala “as though it was never authorised to take deposits”.
Contrary to Kruger’s stance of the bank being technically and legally insolvent, Coetzee said in the affidavit that the bank “does not have a solvency and liquidity problem”.
She said that as of 31 October 2024, Ithala’s total assets amounted to R3.25 billion, while its total liabilities were R2.93 billion.
“Ithala’s assets exceed its liabilities by R316 million,” said Coetzee.
“Regarding the SOC’s liquidity position, it has Cash (physical currency or funds readily available) and Bank (balances in the institution’s bank accounts that can be withdrawn if necessary) of approximately R250 million, and liquid assets in the form of treasury bills and other investments of approximately R400 million.
“The majority of Ithala’s assets are held in loans advanced to clients (ie R2 billion of the R3.2 billion total assets). Ithala’s loan book is 99% secured by an underlying asset that is financed (eg home finance).
“As the majority of Ithala’s assets are locked in the loan book, Ithala is not in a position to pay back all customer deposits held immediately.”
The customer deposit balance is R2.4 billion, said Coetzee, adding that it was commonplace for banks to have an asset/liability mismatch.
“Ithala far exceeds the liquidity requirements as set out in the Banks Act and the additional requirements imposed on Ithala by the Prudential Authority,” she said.
Coetzee said the provincial treasury did not have any “substantive documentary evidence to demonstrate that there are any concerns in respect to the governance and operations of Ithala from the appointed Repayment Administrator”.
The Prudential Authority and Kruger had “not necessarily acted in the best interests of Ithala’s clients as the decisions taken and directives issued have resulted in Ithala’s clients’ funds being put at risk”, she said.
“The inability of Ithala’s clients to access their accounts or banking services is detrimental not only to the clients, which include Sassa grant beneficiaries, but their dependents, and Ithala’s employees and service providers as they no longer have access to any funding.”
She said Kruger’s refusal to pay the salaries of Ithala employees would also have equally detrimental consequences.
“I submit that it is important that Ithala be kept intact to enable the transfer of deposits as foreshadowed by the provincial government, including provincial treasury, and the national government to be given effect to.”
Why Trump wants the Panama Canal and how he could get it:
On Monday 20 January 2025, Donald Trump was once again inaugurated as the president of the US. In his — rather more forceful than the last time — inaugural speech he spoke on many topics but one that caused some international consternation was that of the Panama Canal.
Trump said: “… We gave it to Panama and we’re taking it back.” But why should the US be so dogmatic about reclaiming this tiny strip of South American territory and what justification could they possibly have for doing so?
To understand the US’s claim that it has a right to the Panama Canal we must first understand the history of its construction. The idea for a canal across Panama, which at the time was part of Colombia, was the brainchild of Ferdinand de Lesseps, the celebrated French engineer who completed construction of the Suez Canal in 1869.
In 1879, he organised an international congress in Paris to finalise, and get international support for, connecting the Pacific and Atlantic oceans. This gathering ultimately resulted in the formation of the Compagnie Universelle du Canal Interocéanique de Panama (Universal Company of the Interoceanic Canal of Panama).
France was supportive of the initiative, seeing it as an opportunity to expand its influence in the region. The Colombian government was also on board as it too recognised the opportunities such a canal would offer them, having signed the Wyse Agreement the previous year, authorising the French to build a canal and licensing them to operate it for 99 years.
The failure of the project was largely the result of poor design — while a sea-level canal might have been appropriate for the Suez, the mountainous environment of Panama made such a canal unviable. The expedition also failed to account for the tropical diseases of the region, malaria and yellow fever, which killed more than 22 000 people before the Lesseps company declared bankruptcy and the attempt was abandoned in 1889.
That seemed to be that but president Theodore Roosevelt saw the opportunities the Panama Canal could offer the US and attempted to negotiate with Colombia to secure the right to complete it. Colombia refused and so the US supported an independence movement which saw the declaration of Panamanian independence from Colombia in 1903 and the signing of the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty with the new Panamanian government. This gave sovereignty over the canal to the US in perpetuity.
Construction of the canal by the US began in 1904 and it was officially opened on 15 August 1914.
The canal remained sovereign territory of the US until 1977 when president Jimmy Carter and Panama’s leader Omar Torrijos signed the Torrijos-Carter Treaties, which agreed to the handover of the canal to Panama over a period to be completed by 31 December 1999 and that it would be operated by Panamanian state-owned entity the Panama Canal Authority (PCA).
It just so happened that, during this period, 1997, Hong Kong-based company Hutchison Whampoa (known today as CK Hutchison Holdings) successfully obtained 25-year leases for both the Balboa and the Cristóbal ports on either side of the canal. These leases were renewed in 2022 for an additional 25 years.
Right, now that we are all caught up, why does Trump want the US to “take it back”?
Well, for starters, it is a global choke point for international shipping and is the most efficient route between the Atlantic and Pacific oceans. Without the canal, ships would have to sail south around Cape Horn at the bottom of South America, or else north through the Bering Strait. This would add significantly to the distance and time required to traverse the route and increase the cost of shipping, which would ultimately drive up the cost of goods for consumers.
Roughly 14% of all US trade ships use the canal — about 72% of all shipping that uses it. China makes up the second highest percentage with about 21% of all canal shipping. US control of the canal would allow them to set the tolls for using it and ensure that US shipping was “treated fairly”, something Trump argued is not the case under PCA control.
The matter of fairness is of particular importance as, alongside the Torrijos-Carter, a second agreement, the Treaty Concerning the Permanent Neutrality and Operation of the Panama Canal, was also signed. Should the US be able to provide evidence of unfair treatment of US shipping by the PCA, they could argue that article 4 of the treaty, which guarantees canal neutrality, has been violated and is therefore void. This could give the US a pretence for re-establishing US control of the canal.
However, such action would require very compelling evidence to succeed and even then would probably attract international condemnation.
Another comment made in Trump’s inaugural speech — “China is operating the Panama Canal” — must be interrogated. The PCA denies this, however, the US could argue that control of the ports on either side of the canal gives China undue influence over operations and is therefore a breach of the spirit of the treaty, particularly of article 5, which requires that only Panama can operate the canal and maintain military forces or installations within the national territory.
Any argument regarding the militarisation of the canal by a foreign power would have to be proved but, should it be determined that operation of the ports violates the spirit of neutrality and the requirement of Panamanian control of the canal, the US could use this as a justification for pushing their territorial claim.
One could argue, as the PCA does, that Chinese operation of the ports does not constitute a violation, as it has maintained control of the operations of the canal itself, but the US might not accept that position.
It should also be noted that the US could be alarmed by the possibility of military and espionage activities occurring in the Chinese-controlled ports.
This is despite CK Hutchison Holdings being a private company. The US could argue that, due to the nature of Chinese governmental control over private industry, and its activities in Hong Kong, the lines between private and state control of the business has been blurred.
This claim would also require sufficient evidence and any action taken by the US could be seen as hostile, warranting a Chinese response.
Another factor to be taken into account is the opportunity for whoever has control over the Panama Canal to exert influence, both military and diplomatic, over the region. US control would firmly establish its dominance over the Western Hemisphere. It would be in line with the Monroe doctrine, which demands no foreign influence on the American continent in order to establish a sphere of influence separate from the problems of the rest of the world, and could be seen as a vital security objective for the Trump administration.
There are some downsides for the US in pushing their territorial claim over the Panama Canal, not just a potential response from China and the possibility of international condemnation, but also the alienation of countries in the region.
Trump could choose to make use of bilateral agreements with individual countries to mitigate the effects on US relations with Latin America or he could choose to portray any action the US takes as of importance for regional stability and resistance to be the result of weak and corrupt leaders.
Any criticism he is faced with at home could be excused as the actions of unpatriotic elements so beholden to international interests that their opposition is merely an extension of their opposition to the broader “America first” agenda.
Regardless of how Panama, or the rest of the world feels, Trump has made his intentions for the Panama Canal known. He sees it as being of vital economic, diplomatic and military interest to the US and he wants it back. It is clear from his inaugural address that he believes he has legal cause to take such action.
This must be seen in light of comments on the matter made by Marco Rubio, during his senate confirmation hearing to be secretary of state, that there was a possibility that Panama might have breached the articles of the neutrality agreement.
In short, we must take account of the fact that Trump is a dealmaker — he loves to win and any move he makes must be seen to be a win for his America first agenda.
The US might settle for leaving the canal itself in the hands of the PCA, should the Panamanian government void the leases to the ports held by China in favour of American companies or companies from a US ally.
Ultimately, would the international fallout stemming from any action taken to assert control of the Panama Canal be offset by the benefits to the US? After all, there are few, if any, capable of stopping the US from taking it over, if that is a decision it chooses to make.
Douglas White is head of circulation and subscriptions at the Mail & Guardian.
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