Homes are being stolen in plain sight:
A tweet is doing the rounds about a woman being evicted from her own home. Not because of a tenant dispute or a missed bond payment. Within hours, the replies flooded in. “Banks and the deeds office are mafias.” “South Africans are under attack.” “Do we still have a country?”
And then, almost on cue, the blame gets put onto foreign nationals, the government and political parties — anyone but the system itself.
The thread of the tweet was extremely insightful.
Buried throughout the panic, I could not believe how many people were having the same experience.
Property fraud like this is a common issue in South Africa.
Homes across the country are being transferred out of the rightful owner’s name and into someone else’s or their company’s name. It is being done through the deeds office and of course, with the help of a transferring attorney.
Imagine thinking you own your property, only to find you don’t. How is that even possible?
Property fraud in South Africa is not new or rare but it is scary how common this has become.
In one widely reported case, a title deed was fraudulently transferred to another person using false documentation. The court had to cancel the registration and restore the property to the rightful owner after finding that the transfer had been tainted by fraud. The court confirmed that even if a property was registered at the Deeds Office, ownership could be reversed if fraud was proved.
The principle, often summarised as “fraud unravels everything”, shows how vulnerable the system can be when false documents and false signatures slip through the process.
“Legally, a fraudulent transfer is not just a mistake; it is void from the start,” explains Cor van Deventer from VDM Attorneys. “The courts can set it aside but that does not mean the process is simple. It often requires urgent legal intervention, high costs and time to correct what should never have happened in the first place.”
What most people do not realise is how many moving parts are involved in a single property transfer. A conveyancer prepares the documents, the bank approves the bond, the Deeds Office registers the transfer, municipal clearance certificates must be issued and IDs must be verified. If any one of those steps is compromised, the entire transaction can be built on a lie.
Property law specialists say common scams include forged IDs, fake title deeds, double sales of the same property and transfers done without the true owner’s knowledge.
In some cases, criminals pose as owners, sell the property and disappear before the fraud is discovered.
Bond originator Hannah van Deventer from Phoenix Bonds, says the public often assumes the bank controls the entire process, when in reality the system is split across multiple institutions.
“People think the bank checks everything but the bank only approves the loan. “The transfer process involves conveyancers, the Deeds Office, municipalities and identity verification. If one link in the chain fails, the whole transaction can still go through on paper,” she told me.
That fragmentation is exactly why these cases create so much panic online. By the time a sheriff arrives at a property, the legal process has moved through several layers of the system. Reversing all this might not be so easy.
Fraud in South Africa is rising across multiple sectors, with studies showing that nearly half of organisations have reported an increase in fraud-related incidents in recent years.
Property transactions are particularly vulnerable because they involve large sums of money, multiple parties and documents that rely heavily on manual verification.
When people hear that someone is being evicted from a house they thought they owned, the reaction is immediately fear, anger and blame.
But the real issue is not foreigners, one political party or one department. It is that our property system depends on processes designed for a slower, less digital world, while criminals continue to adapt much faster than that. Criminals are forever finding new ways to scam the system. Perhaps if we relied on a blockchain to store our title deeds, we could make a dent in this specific problem.
If someone can sell your home without you knowing and the system can enforce that sale before you even realise what has happened, then we need not worry about property fraud existing (because it does), we need to worry about the old-school systems we have in place and why they are so easy to penetrate.
Is state capture metamorphosing into higher education capture?:
Even though I do not know the full extent of the allegations against Professors Sakhela Buhlungu and Nokuthula Sibiya, their cases may well fall squarely in this category of flimsy allegations. The Zondo and Madlanga commissions have helped to lay bare state capture in South Africa. With some of it dramatised on TV through many witnesses, only a few could claim not to know what it is.
On 23 March 2026, Universities South Africa (USAf) held a seminal webinar on institutional governance, focusing on what was termed institutional capture in the higher education sector. Evidently, state capture inspired this webinar.
The jury is still out on what institutional capture, if separate from state capture, really is. There is ample evidence, though, that these two concepts overlap and even coalesce, as some of the external and internal protagonists are of the same ilk.
From the presentations and discussions, it became apparent that both internal and external forces are at work. Because it takes two to tango, the familiar external players — consisting of politicians, so-called business forums, convocation factions and criminals — collude with some internal staff with the sole intention to capture and gorge.
For all we know, the higher education sector might even have some senior managers who aid and abet institutional capture, just as the Madlanga commission has outed some high-ranking police officers alleged to have facilitated police capture.
When state or institutional capture rears its ugly head, it brooks no opposition and nobody may stand in its way. If one resists, one will be shoved aside, no matter how flimsy or trumped-up the allegations may be.
In my 20 years as a vice-chancellor, at least three attempts have been made to remove me for daring to stand up against power, corruption and malfeasance. This occurred in 2012, when I was at the Central University of Technology — where I served for 10 years as vice-chancellor and principal.
Similar attempts to remove me have since occurred two more times, at the Durban University of Technology, where I am in my 10th year as vice-chancellor and principal.
The most recent, and perhaps the most desperate attempt, was in September 2024. It would be laughable if it were not such a tragic illustration of ongoing attempts to capture higher education institutions.
For my first 10-year tenure as vice-chancellor, I was without a bodyguard. But I might not have survived the last eight years without bodyguards — thanks to the clear, present and continuing danger to my life amid the raging waves of institutional capture.
Part of the genesis of the last attempt against me is a meeting I had with some members of convocation in 2018, when they directly accused me of not giving them tenders — as if giving tenders were part of my job profile, authority or competence. It is not a coincidence that all those convocants had once been in the SRC and their comrades were in council until recently.
In South Africa, being in the SRC often connotes deep political roots aligned with political parties that practise what they call democratic centralism — clearly a warped and corrupt understanding of the original meaning of the concept.
As understood and practised by capturers of institutions, democratic centralism is inimical to academia. It means the big political bosses, deeply implicated in state capture, run the show and everyone must fall like dominoes. There is, thus, this deep and insidious link with politics behind all developments we see in institutional capture.
Recently, we have seen vice-chancellors being dressed down and almost frog-marched publicly in parliament. Site visits are replete with overt and covert messages in the corridors about tenders, the main instrument of state and institutional capture.
Given a safe platform that President Cyril Ramaphosa could perhaps provide, I could mention names — but not yet. Indeed, many of us could mention names in high places. Even some very new vice-chancellors are not spared these flimsy or trumped-up allegations, so they know at the beginning of their tenures that they must not upset the apple cart of capture.
They must respect this warped version of democratic centralism as politicians and their lackeys continue to be on the prowl for resources by whatever means.
Even though I do not know the full extent of the allegations against Buhlungu (University of Fort Hare) and Sibiya (Mangosuthu University of Technology), their cases may well fall squarely in this category of flimsy allegations.
Let me briefly analyse what Buhlungu is being accused of — namely, the appointment of executive directors that did not follow due process, as reported in newspaper articles.
Articles published so far reveal that it is he who, in the first place, went to the council to explain and correct this through condonation, which is a generally accepted practice in any organisation. Clearly, there have been gaps in the human resources division at Fort Hare. Coincidentally, one of the executive directors is meant to strengthen this division. None of the articles points to any malicious intent on the part of Buhlungu.
For all we know, Buhlungu may have been trying to deal with an emergency for which he hoped to obtain subsequent council condonation. But because there has been a scramble to find something against him, this opportunity has not been missed.
The reason we have the internal audit function in many organisations is that professionals know there will be instances that may not have followed established processes and controls and will require condonation or ratification.
As long as there is no malicious intent, lessons are taken, missteps corrected and work continues. If we were to suspend and discipline everyone who missed a process — without malicious intent — many would have to be suspended and disciplined in organisations.
Could Fort Hare’s council, or rather some members in it, be captured by politicians and high-ranking civil servants who practise this perverse form of democratic centralism?
Could this suspension be a backlash against Buhlungu’s stoic posture against corruption? Could it be a response to the fact that, through his agency, the Special Investigating Unit (SIU) has outed about 33 people, many of whom are high-ranking politicians and civil servants, for fraudulent degrees from Fort Hare?
Has Buhlungu’s recent no-holds-barred interview with Ann Bernstein from CDE rubbed Fort Hare’s council the wrong way? Could the chair of council, relatively junior in the higher education sector, be seeking to ascend to the vice-chancellorship and be unable to wait for Buhlungu to leave? God forbid.
It is instructive to note that the relevant parliamentary portfolio committee immediately stated support for the council’s action. Could it not have waited until the disciplinary processes had been completed?
The seemingly excellent coordination between the portfolio committee and the council may not be that innocent. In that statement, none of the work Buhlungu has been doing against corruption is mentioned, let alone appreciated. Why would those with fellow politicians in the dock appreciate what Buhlungu has done?
I write this article fully aware that it will be seen by politicians, their ilk, so-called business forums and convocation factions as an attack on them and as an attempt to derail their agendas. In 2011/12, I faced the consequences after writing a similar article. I will most likely be called to parliament for a dressing-down and ridicule. I am at the tail end of my tenure and have little to lose. I must speak, and I will speak.
Sooner or later, there will be no one to speak for vice-chancellors, university executives and universities.
This country must act to stem the tide of institutional capture in the higher education sector. If not, universities will be hollowed out. They will soon lose their leadership on the continent. South Africa will be left with universities that are not what they should be.
Just as we have had the Zondo and Madlanga commissions, perhaps President Ramaphosa will one day institute a commission of inquiry into institutional capture in the higher education sector.
I am glad the minister of finance has recently identified the NSFAS system as one form of capture — my words, not his. Does the president need more evidence?
Professor Thandwa Mthembu is the vice-chancellor and principal at Durban University of Technology. He writes in his personal capacity and as a proud alumnus of the University of Fort Hare.
Resourcing African agency: A practical agenda for the continent’s future:
In the midst of prevailing global disorder, great-power realignment, and uncertainties lies an opportunity to create a just and inclusive world for greater prosperity. Amid this cautious optimism, the question is not whether African agency matters, but how it is resourced. When supported, it strengthens resilience, deepens democratic participation, and sustains development. When undermined, it constrains Africa’s ability to shape its own future. The real challenge is to ensure material support that advances continental priorities and shapes global norms.
In a shifting multipolar landscape, Africa’s greatest asset is the capacity of its people to organize, lead, and define their own development. Yet, despite broad consensus on local ownership, dependence on external funding persists, limiting genuine agency. This consensus needs translation into meaningful support, as only Africans can build the societies they truly aspire to.
African agency must be deliberately built around three priorities. First, African-led initiatives need reliable resources and strong domestic partnerships to reduce dependence on external actors, who bring their own agendas. Second, it requires institutions that protect civic space, encourage innovation, and enable open public dialogue. Third, the next generation must be equipped to lead, as they will shape the continent’s future. At its core, African agency is the capacity to define priorities, mobilize resources, and implement locally grounded solutions.
Resourcing African agency starts with real control over reliable, locally generated resources. For instance, initiatives like the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) and AUDA-NEPAD are presented as African-led. However, in practice, they operate within a web of external funding, technical support, and institutional influence. Organizations such as the Millennium Challenge Corporation, Germany’s Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ), and Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) support these initiatives, often on their own terms and priorities.
This influence extends beyond funding. It appears in how decision-making systems are designed, public policies are shaped, and even who sits at the table. Over time, this creates initiatives that are African in name but partly shaped by external actors in function. Yet, when resources and partnerships are anchored locally, African actors gain the capacity to set agendas rather than simply respond to them. This can occur through several reinforcing mechanisms.
Strong domestic resource mobilization. When African governments increase internally generated revenue through improved tax systems, sovereign wealth funds, pension funds, and development banks, they can finance regional programs themselves. This breeds better outcomes than relying primarily on external partners. Consequently, if continental initiatives like the AfCFTA are funded largely through African fiscal resources, governments and regional institutions gain greater freedom to prioritize sectors, timelines, and regulatory approaches that reflect African economic realities.
A strong role for regional financial institutions and development banks. Strengthening African-owned financial institutions can shift the balance of influence. Institutions such as the African Development Bank (AfDB) and the African Export-Import Bank (Afreximbank) can finance infrastructure and facilitate regional trade through industrial development projects. Such mechanisms support AfCFTA implementation without the policy conditionalities often attached to external funding. Locally controlled finance allows African policymakers to determine investment priorities.
African private sector participation. Domestic businesses and investors play a crucial role in shaping economic agendas. When African SMEs, large corporations, and investment institutions actively participate in trade corridors and manufacturing enclaves, it boosts domestic capacity and agency. This can be achieved through their involvement in logistics systems and digital platforms linked to the AfCFTA. They can also drive policy demand from within the continent rather than relying on externally designed programs.
Local knowledge production and policy research. African universities, think tanks, and research institutions should be adequately financed to generate contextually relevant analytical frameworks that inform policymaking. As it stands, heavy reliance on externally funded research dispossesses African governments of intellectual leadership over development strategies—even for institutions like the African Leadership Centre (ALC) and the Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa (CODESRIA). For instance, the African Union and AUDA-NEPAD should fund local research and data production through these institutions and universities to inform continental programs.
Finally, cross-sector domestic partnerships are important. Stronger collaboration among African governments, civil society organizations, businesses, and research institutions can build locally rooted policy coalitions that shape priorities collectively. These partnerships strengthen accountability and ensure development agendas reflect African communities’ needs rather than external funding cycles.
Essentially, embedding continental policymaking and implementation within African societies, institutions, and resources sustains agency at its core. This internally drives strategies that enable African actors to define pan-continental objectives, timelines, and development pathways according to their own priorities—for collective prosperity at home and the uplifting of dignity abroad.
Resources alone are not enough to sustain African agency. It also depends on strong institutions and an open public space where ideas can be debated and decisions shaped.
Government bodies, knowledge institutions, and civil society organizations provide platforms through which policies are discussed, contested, and legitimized—while enabling citizens to hold power accountable. Institutions such as the African Leadership Centre and Africans for the Horn of Africa Initiative show what is possible, but they operate under real constraints: limited funding, political pressure, and fragile regulatory environments.
Strengthening these institutions is therefore essential. They generate and circulate knowledge, support informed policymaking, and create space for meaningful public engagement. More importantly, they allow diverse voices—youth, women, and grassroots communities—to shape national priorities and hold leadership accountable. Empowering knowledge institutions, policy research, and civic engagement creates the intellectual infrastructure African societies need to shape their own development paths. In this sense, institutions are not only administrative structures but spaces where collective agency takes shape, helping societies think and act critically about their futures.
The third dimension of resourcing African agency lies in the leadership of the continent’s young people. Statistics from multiple sources confirm Africa has the world’s youngest population. Data and research indicate their ideas, ambitions, and creativity are shaping the continent’s political, economic, and technological trajectories—and the futures of its communities for decades to come.
Yet youth leadership is often discussed more than nurtured. While young Africans are celebrated for their innovation and dynamism in arts, technology, and more, many face structural barriers that limit their participation in socioeconomic reproduction and decision-making.
Empowering the next generation requires more than symbolic inclusion. It demands investments in education systems that cultivate critical thinking, creativity, and progressive civic engagement. It requires mentorship opportunities connecting emerging leaders with experienced practitioners in government, academia, and civil society. And it calls for institutional reforms that open space for young people to contribute meaningfully to policymaking. Supporting these efforts is not merely a matter of fairness; it is a strategic necessity for resourcing and sustaining the continent’s agency. The challenges facing Africa—from rapid urbanization to climate change—will require bold ideas and long-term vision. Young leaders are uniquely positioned to bring both. For African policy actors, investing in youth leadership means recognizing that Africa’s future is already being shaped by the generation coming of age today.
Ultimately, resourcing African agency means moving beyond symbolic acts and rhetoric toward deliberate policy actions that invest in the continent’s people, institutions, and ideas. This begins with African public intellectuals and policy actors realizing that exercising substantive agency in the international system comes alive when local communities have the autonomy and support to shape their own futures.
If policymakers, public intellectuals, and civil society leaders commit to this agenda, the result will be more than stronger institutions or more effective policies. Africa will become a continent where people define the priorities, design the solutions, and lead the transformations that shape its path in the twenty-first century and beyond. In the end, the promise of African agency is not simply about who participates in development, but who has the power to imagine and build the future.
H. E. Ms Macenje “Che Che” Mazoka is the Zambian High Commissioner in the United Kingdom, Ambassador to Ireland and the Holy See and co-hosted the African Public Square debate at the African Leadership Centre, King’s College London
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