Navigating new waters: The effects of the GNU’s foreign policy on key partners:
After the inauguration of South Africa’s Government of National Unity (GNU) and President Cyril Ramaphosa, US ambassador Reuben Brigety made a noteworthy statement: “It’s not for us, or anyone else, to decide what their government should look like.
“As the government of America, we will engage with the current government and continue to work on our robust bilateral agenda, focusing on common needs like job creation, healthcare, trade and justice. We will engage with the president once he decides on the cabinet.”
Brigety’s remarks imply that the US is taking a hands-off approach, refraining from influencing South Africa’s foreign policy under the new administration, a stance that marks a departure from previous interactions.
However, the US’s historical response to South Africa’s independent, non-aligned stance on certain global issues, such as its reluctance to align with US positions on international conflicts, hinted at an eagerness for the country to lean towards its strategic agenda.
Despite this, President Joe Biden’s concise congratulatory message to Ramaphosa signalled a readiness to foster improved relations and collaborate closely with South Africa’s new government.
These reactions raise crucial questions about how the GNU will shape diplomatic relations with key international players such as the US. Will the new government adopt a foreign policy that diverges from past practices?
The transition to a GNU under Ramaphosa indicates a potential shift in how South Africa will navigate its global interactions, particularly with the US. This is especially pertinent, given the differing foreign policy philosophies of the ANC and the Democratic Alliance (DA).
How these divergent ideologies will reconcile in the context of the country’s international strategy remains a matter of significant interest and scrutiny.
Previously, South Africa’s foreign policy was characterised by a balancing act — striving to maintain good relations with diverse global powers while advocating for African unity and independence. However, maintaining this neutral stance has not been without challenges, leading to tensions, particularly with Western countries.
Recent global events have further highlighted these difficulties. South Africa’s relationship with Russia and China is a prime example of this friction. The country’s close ties with these nations, coupled with its reluctance to condemn Russia after its invasion of Ukraine, have strained relations with the US.
The decision to maintain an independent stance, rather than align with Western condemnation of Russia, has led to significant diplomatic consequences. The US, viewing South Africa’s position as a deviation from expected Western norms, has responded with various diplomatic pressures.
These have included threats to review trade ties, allegations of arms supplies to Russia and other moves aimed at pushing it to reconsider its stance.
On the other hand, the DA, part of the GNU along with the ANC, takes a different approach to global issues, often aligning more closely with the US position. For example, the DA has expressed scepticism about South Africa’s membership of Brics+, particularly criticising its strong connections with Russia and China.
The party has openly backed Ukraine in the Russia-Ukraine conflict and censured South Africa’s neutral stance. DA leader John Steenhuisen’s visit to Ukraine emphasised this position, with him stating, “It is strongly in South Africa’s interest to stand with the free world and come out hard against Russian aggression.” This highlights the DA’s desire for a foreign policy that is less confrontational toward Western interests.
The DA’s lukewarm reaction to the Gaza crisis also reflects its alignment with Western viewpoints. With the DA’s involvement in the GNU, South Africa’s foreign policy might evolve toward a more neutral approach, especially on contentious global issues.
What this means for South Africa and the US
This could mean that the US might finally have significant influence in how South Africa engages in international relations. First, it could mean that the country will take openly Western-aligned actions that could trigger friction with key trading players, such as fellow Brics members Brazil, Russia, India and China.
The US might want to take advantage of South Africa’s local dynamics to further its own agenda of frustrating its competitors, China and Russia particularly. Meaning South Africa could potentially deviate from pursuing the African agenda in international multilateral platforms such as the G20+, of which it is set to assume the chair next year, and the Brics+ group of nations.
The US is threatened by the growing influence of both China and Russia in Africa and might want to use its influence on South Africa to curb this.
The African agenda stands antithetical to Western domination and influence. Maintaining the balancing act and remaining covert in championing the African agenda will be complicated for South Africa, especially given that, although the government remains unitary, owing to the GNU, the dynamics within it have significantly changed. Thus, arriving at decisions could prove to be tedious, cumbersome and protracted.
We could see credence being given to the view that South Africa could end up as the weakest link, destabilising the Brics+ group.
What South Africa needs to do
To begin with, South Africa will have to work tactfully to pursue its collective national, regional and continental interests in global affairs. In addition, it will have to guard against the overbearing influence of the US on its national and foreign affairs policies.
More alarmingly, the country could be used as a proxy within the Brics+ group of states to destabilise and frustrate the group’s agenda — or simply go against it.
Finally, South Africa will have to assert itself robustly as it maintains relations with its key trading partners, China and Russian especially, which do not always see eye to eye with the US.
Drs Bongiwe Mphahlele and Chidochashe Nyere are researchers at the Institute for Pan-African Thought and Conversation at the University of Johannesburg.
Cabinet ‘clearing house’ will meet this week to resolve GNU partner disputes:
Deputy President Paul Mashatile will chair the dispute resolution committee
Coordinates identified for Ethiopian drone massacre in Amhara, opening way for war crimes probe:
The camera pans over a gruesome mangled mess of blood, limbs and bodies as wailing voices console each other and discuss how to dislodge dismembered human remains from the wreckage of an obliterated Isuzu truck.
The horrific footage, far too graphic to publish in its entirety, surfaced undated and unverified on the web earlier this year.
Anonymous uploaders claimed it depicted the aftermath of a deadly drone strike in Ethiopia’s north-western Amhara region on 19 February.
The strike killed at least 30 civilians.
“They wiped us out,” said one survivor, who lost seven relatives in the attack and later helped to transport their bodies.
“They had been dancing and celebrating just a few hours before. Then we had to collect their bodies piece by piece. I haven’t felt alive since that day.”
The survivor confirmed that the attack came from an unmanned aerial vehicle, more commonly known as a drone.
“There were two drones we saw that day. One was a dark coloured one with a low roar. This was the one that attacked. But there was another one, a surveillance drone which had a lighter shade and a red flashing light, as if it was recording us.”
Initially, it was difficult to confirm accounts of the massacre.
As the conflict between the state and the rebel Fano militia has intensified, the government has denied journalists access to the region and imposed significant restrictions on mobile communication.
The army denied that any civilians had died, describing the incident as an army operation that led to the killing and capture of rebel militants.
Eyewitness testimony
The army’s version of events was contradicted just days later when the first media reports emerged, notably in the Addis Standard and on BBC Amharic.
These reports included harrowing eyewitness testimony. The dead were from only three or four families.
An infant who had just been baptised survived, but seven of his relatives were killed – some still wearing their white ceremonial dress. Other bodies were too mangled to properly identify.
There was one detail on which the media reports did not agree – the exact location of the massacre.
Addis Standard said it happened in Sasit, a small town north of Debre Birhan.
The BBC located it at “Fela Megenteya”, which loosely translates as “Fela Turn” – an informal name that does not appear on any maps.
Some activists said it was in another, slightly larger town, called Sela Dingay.
All of these locations are found in the same district, within 30km of each other.
But no one had exact co-ordinates for where the strike occurred.
This is important for two reasons. Symbolically, it is difficult to honour the dead when we don’t even know where they were killed. And practically, it is much harder to collect evidence of war crimes when we don’t know where to look.
Pinpointing the massacre
The drone strike was only the latest in a string of deadly drone strikes since the outbreak of war in August 2023, between the Ethiopian army and ethnic Amhara rebels known as the Fano.
More than 300 civilians have died in at least 31 drone strikes in Amhara in the past year alone, according to reports collated by the Armed Conflict Location and Events Database.
The Ethiopian national army and the Fano militia are former allies who together fought against rebels from Tigray, another region in northern Ethiopia, from 2020 to 2022.
They fell out after Fano militants were ordered to disarm and disband, following the signing of a peace treaty in Pretoria that ended the war on Tigray.
Instead, Fano fighters remobilised and captured a slew of towns across their home region in August 2023.
The federal troops deployed to crush them have struggled to contend with Fano’s familiarity with the terrain and the wide support they enjoy among the locals.
The federal army has been repeatedly implicated in human rights abuses against civilians in the region.
A previous visual investigation by The Continent, a little over a month into the conflict, geolocated footage of Ethiopian army extrajudicial killings of civilians to an area near a police academy in the Amhara town of Debre Markos.
In the initial video footage of the February drone massacre, there was not enough visual evidence to conclusively geolocate the attack.
This changed when additional images – 12 photographs and a 65-second video clip – were delivered to The Continent by Misganaw Belete, a lawyer and human rights advocate who was based in the Amhara capital Bahir Dar, and worked with a team to compile evidence of war crimes across the region.
“Unfortunately, the war in Amhara is underreported,” said Misganaw. “The world’s focus is elsewhere. By compiling evidence today, we may assure that accountability and closure for victims may be obtained tomorrow.”
By authenticating the new evidence and analysing open-source documents and satellite imagery, The Continent successfully geolocated the massacre to a specific four-way intersection between villages in the rural Amhara North Shewa Zone, some 220km northeast of Addis Ababa and nine kilometres west of Sasit.
The big clue came in the footage provided by Misganaw, which showed bodies in clearly discernible civilian attire.
In the background, two connected transmission towers are visible a few hundred metres apart, parallel to the wreckage of the truck. There is a village in the distance.
The attack appeared to have taken place at an intersection of two roads.
Publicly sourced documents, including a 2022 village assessment study produced by the International Organisation for Migration, lists a village by the name of Fela, with precise coordinates.
On Google Earth – which erroneously names this location as “Jingodo” – a fourway intersection is clearly visible leading into the village, with the transmission towers in the background.
The visual evidence is consistent with eyewitness descriptions of “Fela Turn”, making this overwhelmingly likely to have been the site of the drone massacre.
The site’s coordinates are 9°56’10.7”N 39°25’06.9”E.
When war crimes investigators are finally able to access Amhara, this is where they can begin to collect evidence.
Ethiopian government spokesperson Billene Seyoum did not respond to an emailed request for comment.
Last week, the Ethiopian army announced plans for a major new offensive against Fano militias in Amhara, claiming that efforts to find a peaceful resolution have failed.
“The only language they understand is force. From now on we will talk to them in that language,” said army spokesperson Colonel Getnet Adane.
Submit and get free exposure here: Showcase Your Business | Advertise Your Special Offers.

