PART TWO: Rise Mzansi promises social democracy but delivers neoliberalism:
South Africa’s economic stagnation and social decay stand as a damning testimony to the failure of neoliberal economic policies. With millions hungry, jobless and poor, one would hope that parties contesting the general elections would offer to forge a new path towards economic growth and social upliftment.
Initially one assumed that Rise Mzansi, claiming to be social democrats and adopting the campaign slogan “2024 is our 1994”, would maybe signal the dawn of a party armed with the imagination and political boldness to offer alternatives that break away from neoliberal policy-making.
Rise Mzansi’s manifesto presents no compelling fiscal or macroeconomic strategies beyond continuing South Africa’s unsustainable dependance on private sector investment and export-oriented growth. Worse, the manifesto proposes “private investment in public assets” to reduce fiscal risk and stimulate investment in the economy. This form of investment can unfold in several ways.
One option is public-private partnerships, in which the government enters into long-term contracts with private sector partners. Another approach is converting the funds for infrastructure projects into financial instruments that can be traded on on the financial market, turning infrastructure into an asset class. There is also the strategy of so-called blended finance, which occurs when public funds or developmental finance is used to lure private investment by providing a series of incentives, whether it be subsidies, capital grants or revenue guarantees.
The strategy of seeking private investment in public infrastructure is one straight out of the neoliberal playbook, in line with the trend of “de-risking”. This is evidenced by a telling statement from the 12th president of the World Bank Group in 2017, who argued “we have to start by asking routinely whether private capital, rather than government funding or donor aid, can finance a project. If the conditions are not right for private investment, we need to work with our partners to de-risk projects, sectors, and entire countries.”
Infrastructure projects, especially in developing or underdeveloped nations, require large resources and carry a number of risks that can be unpalatable to private investors, who seek returns on their investments that are not outweighed by risk. Therefore, governments are increasingly using particular financial tools to de-risk public assets, to ensure they remain commercially attractive to private investors — with dire economic and social consequences.
Even though there is mounting empirical evidence that demonstrates the dangers and failures of public-private partnerships (PPP), both the ruling ANC and Rise Mzansi ignore concerns that numerous political and developmental economists have expressed.
Gathering evidence from several countries (such as Liberia, Spain, Mexico, Peru and India) a collection of civil-society organisations based across Europe recently released a report documenting the failure of public-private partnerships. They argued that “the high fiscal cost of PPPs is due to the high cost of capital; the expectation of profit from the private partner; the high transaction costs associated with the negotiation of complex PPP contracts; and the high likelihood of renegotiation. These higher costs are rarely justified by proven efficiency gains in delivering public services.”
The soaring costs of PPPs and the way in which they expose government’s to higher contingent liabilities is a serious concern for a political party that would aim to avoid increasing government’s overall indebtedness — consequently limiting fiscal space for socio-economic development as servicing debt takes priority over provisioning basic services and public goods.
But the price paid for attracting private investment into public assets is not just monetary, it is also human. Attracting private investment into public assets often requires structural adjustments to fiscal, monetary, labour and industrial policy that are not in the best interest of the public. To ensure profitability, the past 30 years of private sector investment for infrastructure development has often resulted in the commodification of basic services and the transformation of citizens into precarious consumers.
The poor state of South Africa’s water, electricity and public transport provisions are not just a consequence of corruption and mismanagement, but the decades-long attempts to court the private sector into investing in public assets through deregulation, commercialization and gradual privatisation in the form of PPPs.
The simple fact is that private sector investors are accountable to their shareholders, not to citizens. Why should a nation seeking to overcome unemployment or poverty, concede more and more of its infrastructure, social obligations or strategic industries to shareholders or chief executives whose lives and interests are so far removed from the realities of most South Africans? Rise Mzansi’s proposition of relying on private investment serves the first objective of neoliberalism: re-establishing the conditions for capital accumulation.
How will Rise Mzansi solve the energy crisis?
The People’s Manifesto is absolutely correct in identifying Eskom’s dysfunction as a colossal constraint to the flourishing of economic activity. Where the party begins to falter is in the ambiguity of their solutions to load-shedding and their generally moderate approach to the energy crisis. Eskom’s recent history unveils the pitfalls of attempting to court private sector investment into public assets and reveals the disastrous outcomes of commercialising and commodifying basic services — which is a instrumental requirement for the kinds of public-private partnerships Rise Mzansi seeks to foster.
The genesis of the energy crisis is a consequence of a destabilising contradiction in Eskom’s operation: the state-owned utility is governed under a corporate mandate — operating as a private company — but it is expected to provide a universal public good.
Beginning in the 1980s (after the De Villiers Commission) Eskom underwent a commercialisation process, which meant the utility would change from a not-for-profit utility (partly subsidised by the government through tax revenue) with the mandate of providing cheap electricity to central industries and the white population. It would now become a utility that also had the objective of operating for financial gain. This process of commercialisation advanced, initiating Eskom’s corporatisation as the ANC government embraced neoliberal policy in the Growth, Employment and Redistribution plan (Gear). By 1998, Eskom became a limited liability company, with this transformation taking full effect in 2002.
It is critical to note that the government’s attempts to seduce the private sector into generating electricity started as early as 1998, with the White Paper on Energy envisioning 30% of generation coming from private sector producers and identifying Eskom’s unbundling as a key reform for the development of South Africa’s energy sector.
Yet, in trying to create space for private sector investment into the energy sector, the government denied Eskom’s request for public financing to boost its generation capacity and electrification efforts. Eskom’s leadership warned that if the new generation was not built before the turn of the century, supply would run short by 2007. Load-shedding struck South Africans for the first time in 2007.
Arising from the structural reforms to Eskom’s operations and financing were a series of pivotal changes: government became its sole shareholder and its tax exempt status was removed, but most importantly, the utility adopted the full-cost recovery model and the user-pays principle.
The user pays principle( a concept beloved by the world World Bank) maintains that “all costs associated with the use of a resource should be included in the prices of the goods and services (including government services) that result from the use”. And the full-cost recovery model has meant Eskom is mandated and dependent on selling electricity to us (as end-users) to raise revenue and recover the cost of its operations (with additional profits and market-rate debt being raised to fund new projects).
Full-cost recovery, within Eskom’s financing and in the municipal financing framework, has been a failure of epic proportions, resulting in the millions not being able to tangibly experience their socio-economic rights and effective basic service provision. Because South Africa is overwhelmed by economic stagnation, mass unemployment, stagnant or low wages and pervasive poverty, many if not most citizens could not and cannot afford the electricity Eskom sells (or the price mark-up by municipalities).
According to researcher David A McDonald, “a 2002 survey by the Municipal Services Project and the Human Sciences Research Council found that up to 10 million people have had their water and/or electricity cut off since 1994. In most cases, those cut off were simply unable to pay the rising costs of water and electricity.”
By passing costs on to consumers through the full-cost recovery model and user-pays principle, Eskom has undergone years of shrinking revenue streams, meaning a depletion in resources for infrastructure maintenance and building new projects to boost its generative capacity. Instead of receiving sustainable public financing, the utility has relied on requesting tariff increases and taking out loans (domestic and foreign) to stay financially afloat.
But tariff increases produce more instances of non-payment and servicing debt (especially foreign debt with high interest rates and debt that must be paid back in a foreign currency as the rand depreciates) is a cost the utility has struggled to bear. Compounding costs, which take resources away from maintenance, is the burden of energy bought from independent power producers (IPP). In 2023, IPP contracts accounted for more than a third of primary energy costs, while contributing only 8% of total installed capacity.
Colossal debt, narrowing revenue streams, soaring tariff increases, low generation capacity and private generation gradually chomping up Eskom’s market share all result from a long journey towards unbundling and the creation of a competitive electricity market.
Progressive political movements, trade unions and civil-society organisations have in recent years expressed serious doubts as to whether unbundling and marketisation will rid us of this energy crisis. Moreover, numerous energy experts and civil society organisations alongside grassroots movements have intervened to highlight that a just energy transition and a low-carbon economy cannot be achieved in a liberalised energy sector. So when Rise Mzansi’s manifesto proposes that they will “accelerate the shift to a more decentralised energy system” one can only understand this position to be a political euphemism for unbundling and liberalising our energy sector.
The party should be commended for realising the need to provide free electricity to low-income households, moving away from coal-dependency and fixing the procurement system while improving the expertise of those who manage Eskom, overall the policy proposals regarding the energy crisis offer no significant departure from government’s current plans. Furthermore, they lack needed clarity on the question of ownership in the energy sector.
Eskom needs to be transformed. In other words it must be de-corporatised (abandoning the full-cost recovery model) and be provided with sustainable public financing so that it possess the internal capacity to renew its infrastructure and play a central role in the green industrialisation South Africa needs if we are serious about confronting the climate crisis while creating jobs and growing the economy.
But beyond this, Eskom must be democratised, citizens must play a substantive role in holding the utility accountable and ensuring its financing or procurement is transparent. The utility can no longer operate as a private company that is accountable to shareholders and led by the incentive of profit. If we want to overcome unemployment and poverty, while adapting to climate change and mitigating its destruction, South Africa must strengthen its economic and energy sovereignty, but Rise Mzansi’s proposals do not lead us towards this path.
Entering the political landscape as a new political party takes courage and conviction. Rise Mzansi’s leaders and members are admirable for taking initiative to try to correct South Africa’s precarious course. But good intentions do not revive economies or erase inequality.
The overarching issue with Rise Mzansi is that the party’s leadership emerges from a liberal tradition in post-apartheid politics, one which perceives our crises to be solely rooted in bad and corrupt governance. From this an obsession with technocracy develops, mistakenly believing that only ethically righteous and expertly skilled leaders will be our salvation, thereby neglecting the economic structure, macroeconomic policies and relations of property ownership which have put South Africa on a path of decline.
Although Rise Mzansi fails to pull the country out of the living nightmare of neoliberalism, let us wait and see what the polls on 29 May hold for the party’s future.
Andile Zulu is with the Alternative Information and Development Centre in Cape Town.
The Israeli scholarly security state:
This is part two of three excerpts from Maya Wind’s book Towers of Ivory and Steel. Based on research, the book is a gamechanger in the conversation about Israeli academic institutions
The development of Israeli universities is imbricated with the rise of Israeli military industries. Designed as state-building institutions, they were recruited to support its apparatuses of violence soon after their founding. Following the establishment of Hebrew University in Jerusalem in 1918, the Zionist movement founded two additional institutions of higher education in Palestine: the Technion opened in Haifa in 1925, and the Weizmann Institute of Science in Rehovot in 1934. Hebrew University was the Zionist movement’s first comprehensive university dedicated to research and teaching across disciplines; the Technion was designed as the centre of engineering; and the Weizmann Institute was committed to scientific research for state-building. During the intensifying military campaigns leading up to the founding of Israel in 1948, the Zionist movement officially enlisted its three universities.
In 1946, the Haganah Zionist militia established HEMED, the Science Corps, which opened bases on all three campuses. Universities soon became central to the development and manufacture of weapons. In February 1948, a Hebrew University doctoral student in microbiology initiated and headed the biological department at HEMED. By April 1948, the department prepared typhoid-dysentery bacteria to be used as a biological weapon.
Throughout the spring of 1948, the Haganah and other Zionist militias led military campaigns to expel Palestinians and claim their lands. HEMED supported these efforts through departments that focused on chemical, biological, and nuclear research and warfare capabilities, aided by university students and researchers.
HEMED’s biological department typhoid-dysentery bacteria was used in the Haganah’s Cast Thy Bread operation to poison Palestinian water sources. This operation was personally overseen by Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion and planned as a mechanism to prevent Palestinian return to the villages from which they were expelled by Zionist militias. On May 13, 1948, just before the war, Cast Thy Bread was implemented in the recently depopulated Palestinian village of Bayt Mahsir.
As part of the Haganah campaigns to depopulate major Palestinian cities in the weeks leading up to the 1948 war, typhoid-dysentery was used to poison Palestinian communities where they were still living. In early May, the Haganah poisoned water sources in Palestinian neighbourhoods in Jerusalem and the Kabri aqueduct that fed Acre. The poisoning caused a disease outbreak in the targeted Palestinian communities but did not have the debilitating effect its proponents had hoped for.
Moreover, when the operation was expanded to target Egyptian and other Arab forces, Zionist operatives were caught and Arab states brought reports of the poisoning to the UN Security Council. The representative of the Jewish Agency for Palestine, Abba Eban, vehemently denied the operation and worked to prevent further probes into the poisoning by accusing the Arab states of peddling in “antisemitic incitement.” A few months later, by December of 1948, Cast Thy Bread was discontinued by the Zionist leadership and military establishment in Palestine. Despite this, the operation proved to be only the beginning for the Science Corps.
Throughout the remainder of the 1948 war, all HEMED departments were activated, and the faculty and students of the three universities were recruited to conduct military research and experimentation. The Weizmann Institute officially put its equipment and campus buildings at the disposal of the Haganah and, later, the newly formed Israeli military. For its part, the nascent Israeli government’s central recruitment commit- tee released all institute researchers and employees from their military duties and designated them as soldiers by virtue of their work. Senior researchers, employees, and students sustained the institute’s activities 24/7 in rotating shifts. Faculty and students across the three institutions began developing and manufacturing diverse weaponry, including plastic explosives, rockets based on synthetic propellant compounds, shells for mortars and cannons, and ignition mechanisms for Napalm, tear gases, and mines.
By the end of the war, the Weizmann Institute had come to anchor the Military Science Corps and, together with the Technion, became the military-scientific centre of the Israeli state. The 1948 war marked the beginning, not the end, of university militarisation.
Senior administrators and faculty at the Weizmann Institute and the Technion later led the development of Israeli military industries. They advocated establishing Israeli science as the basis of Israeli military power by developing and manufacturing Israeli advanced weaponry. In so doing, these scientists even went against the Israeli military leadership, which often espoused a more conservative approach to military research and development and favoured purchasing weaponry from other states. Ultimately, the scientists won. As Israeli research and development of weapons became institutionalised, the Science Corps was detached from the military. In 1952, HEMED was brought under the Ministry of Defense, where university scientists wielded more influence. It became the Research and Design Directorate, led by David Bergman, one of the founders and senior administrators of the Weizmann Institute. In 1958, the directorate became the Authority for the Development of Armaments (Harashut Haleumit Lepituach Emtzaei Lehima), best known by its Hebrew acronym, Rafael.
One of Israel’s leading state-owned weapons corporations, Rafael is now a major supplier to the Israeli military. It is particularly known for its development and production of missiles, and armour and weapon systems for tanks, jet aircraft, and naval forces. Rafael technology and weapons are deployed in the Occupied Palestinian Territory and, on this basis, exported internationally. True to its origins at the facilities of the Weizmann Institute and the Technion, Rafael still calls itself “the national laboratory of Israel.”
Rafael was not the only weapons company birthed by Israeli academia. With support from the state, the Technion opened a Department of Aeronautical Engineering in 1954. The department tailored specialised courses based on Israeli military needs, and its faculty and students spearheaded the development of Israeli Aerospace Industries (IAI), transforming it into a company that produced Israeli-designed and manufactured fighter jets and missiles. Today, IAI is one of Israel’s leading weapons corporations, supplying the Israeli military with jets, drones, and weapons systems, and exporting them worldwide as “battle proven.”
Since the establishment of these military industries, they have remained embedded in the Technion and are often difficult to distinguish from the university. Scientists and engineers regularly moved back and forth between the university and the weapons companies and have sent their students to join them as employees. The companies, for their part, have funded the establishment of major Technion laboratories, and a network of Technion faculty dedicated to military research and development have functioned as their shadow employees. Technion researchers have developed a wide range of technologies — including new missiles and drones—which have gone into production by Rafael, IAI, and other Israeli weapons corporations, and then gone on to be used by the Israeli military.
Though an industry leader, the Technion is not alone. Israeli universities support the Israeli military, not only by supplying it with weapons, but by training its soldiers. All public universities offer their facilities, faculty, and expertise for Israeli military training, advancing the career development of soldiers and security state personnel through specialised degree-granting programs. Atuda (academic reserve) is a specialised academic program for soldiers—run by the Israeli military and Ministry of Defense, in collaboration with weapons manufacturers and the Administration for the Development of Weapons and Technological Infrastructure—that is administered through the Israeli university system. The Atuda program was developed to offer the Israeli military a cadre of highly educated and specialised soldiers, amid a national draft of high school seniors.
Through Atuda, the Israeli military offers fifty degree programs across all public Israeli universities, covering soldiers’ tuition and granting needs-based stipends in exchange for extended military service as commanders and officers. The wide-ranging disciplines include languages, humanities, law, life sciences, data sciences, and engineering. Through Atuda, soldiers are drafted and then sent to complete academic degrees and basic training, followed by a minimum six years of military service. This elite academic-military track has long operated as a pipeline to both military leadership and academia, as well as to Israel’s military and tech industries.
By the accounts of senior military personnel and academics, the program outputs are consequential. They claim that Atuda is central to Israel’s technological capabilities and competitive edge in the global market. Knowledge and ideas developed through Atuda are not patented by the military, allowing for a “knowledge spillover” into the Israeli private sector. Graduates of Atuda degree programs in physics, maths, and computer science have frequently assumed key positions in Israeli military research and development; some later established their own security sector companies worth millions of dollars.
Israeli military industries and its universities have always been co-constituted. Universities still offer their campuses, resources, students, and faculty to aid in the development of technology and weaponry deployed against Palestinians and then sold worldwide as “battle-proven.” By collaborating with state apparatuses and weapons corporations that enforce Israel’s military occupation and apartheid, Israeli universities function as an academic arm of the Israeli security state and are complicit in its crimes.
Maya Wind is a scholar of Israeli expertise and militarism. She is a Killam Postdoctoral Fellow in the Department of Anthropology at the University of British Columbia.
Lady Zamar returns with vibrant resilience in Rainbow:
Yamikani Banda popularly known as Lady Zamar has released a new album after taking a five year musical hiatus.
Titled Rainbow, the album comes after she endured several public storms that she vows to Apple Music “will never happen again”.
The 12 track album is a solid sonic experience with genres ranging from house, pop to amapiano.
“The journey was kind of hard, we tried the album twice before we actually got it right. I hope people receive it with openness and love and I hope people receive it with a lot of kindness. I hope people enjoy it and want to jam to it,” she tells the Mail & Guardian.
Lady Zamar answers a few colourful questions the M&G asked her following her latest release, Rainbow.
If your music was a colour, what would it be and why?
If my music was a colour it would be pink and green because those are my favourite colours and I think I wore pink a lot in the studio.
What’s the weirdest place or situation you’ve found inspiration for a song?
I was under the impression that I would be assassinated and I would be killed and so I decided to create Party in Heaven.
If you could collaborate with any musician, dead or alive, who would it be and why?
I would collaborate with the Weeknd, I would collaborate with Nina Simon, I would collaborate with Max Martin as well because he is one of the best songwriters in the world. I prefer to work with people who are not big stars but people who are amazing writers. Oh yes! Lastly, as an honorary mention – Babyface. I would ask him to write my album, the whole album.
What’s the most unusual instrument you’ve ever played, and how did you incorporate it into your music?
I have never really played an instrument professionally but I have incorporated marimbas, violins and cellos in my music.
What’s the most memorable fan encounter you’ve had during a performance?
It was during the Lusito Land Festival when I went backstage to the trailers and this one guy walked in and he was just talking about how much he loves my music and he just randomly burst into tears. A grown man crying, it was a very humbling experience and it was an experience that I can never really forget. I wish I remembered his name – it was an experience that made me realise just how much people love me.
If you had to describe your latest album using only movie titles, what would they be?
I think I would use Forrest Gump to describe it because there is this victorious end to the movie where he comes out of his shackles and starts to run and it feels like that for me right now, where I have had this bad situation and bad luck and then I have been able to run and keep going. Another one is Pirates of the Caribbean. Jack Sparrow had always been quirky and full of solutions but never really full of anything and I feel like this album gives you that experience when you are watching Pirates of the Caribbean. It is a fun and adventurous album. As much as there are a lot of things happening in the movie, the feeling of watching it is always exciting and that is exactly how my album feels for me.
If you could perform a concert in any fictional universe, which one would you choose and why?
Oh my gosh! I would actually choose the world of Glee. Glee has inspired me in more ways than I can really say. When I am really sad and feel like I hate the industry I watch Glee and it reminds me again just how much I love music and how much I love performing.
Glee is also a series where a lot of kids don’t fit the status quo of what artists look like. I feel that way about myself, I don’t fit the status quo of what an artist is supposed to be, I am a little corporate in how I present myself. Very serious and sometimes I come across as very strict but the inner me is a world of bubbles and stuff.
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