The ANC’s generational rupture: Change choices for new organisational design:
The 27th National Congress of the African National Congress Youth League, held at the University of Limpopo, was presented as a routine gathering of youth to discuss South Africa’s challenges and scenario planning for the strategy to respond to these issues. It exposed something more troubling: a widening generational rupture within South Africa’s governing party.
The African National Congress (ANC) is not merely facing electoral slippage. It is confronting a structural disconnect between its governing framework and the lived experience of a young, economically precarious electorate. That rupture now threatens its long-term political durability.
A doctrine out of time
The ANC’s intellectual anchor remains its 1969 Strategy and Tactics document, crafted in exile during a struggle defined by racial oppression and political exclusion. That framework provided clarity and cohesion. It identified race, class and gender as the central axes of domination in apartheid South Africa. Those categories remain relevant. But they are no longer sufficient.
Post-1994 South Africa has been shaped not only by liberation but by globalisation, technological change and repeated economic shocks. The 2007-08 global financial crisis, originating in the United States housing and credit markets, triggered South Africa’s first recession since 1992 and cost the country more than a million jobs. The recovery was weak. Average GDP growth since then has hovered below 1%. Population growth has outpaced economic expansion. Real incomes have stagnated. Youth unemployment has climbed above 50% among active job seekers.
These outcomes were not solely the result of domestic policy. Yet policy choices mattered. The post-apartheid state embraced fiscal consolidation and market openness in the mid-1990s. This delivered macroeconomic stability. It did not deliver sustained industrial expansion or labour-absorbing growth. Deindustrialisation thinned sectors capable of employing large numbers of semi-skilled workers. The supply side of the economy weakened.
The result is a paradox: political liberation succeeded; economic inclusion has not.
A young country without a youth dividend
South Africa is demographically young. Roughly 19 million of its population are under 35. The median voter is urban, digitally connected and economically insecure.
This generation did not experience apartheid directly. It experiences the state through job applications that yield no response and the rising cost of living. Its political engagement is less likely to occur through branch meetings and more likely through digital platforms, informal networks and episodic protest.
Voter turnout has fallen steadily from the highs of the late 1990s. Participation among the voting-age population has reached historic lows. This is not simple apathy. It is displacement. Political energy has shifted beyond the ANC’s organisational reach.
Yet the party’s internal culture remains highly centralised. Feedback often arrives only in the form of electoral decline. In such a structure, leaders risk speaking primarily to one another rather than to society. Strategic adaptation becomes slow. Dissent becomes visible only after damage is done.
The limits of rhetorical continuity
The ANC continues to frame its programme around the “National Question”: dismantling racial inequality while confronting class exploitation and patriarchy. These imperatives endure. But they do not automatically generate growth. Building a non-racial and non-sexist society without delivering broad-based prosperity weakens the credibility of both goals. Social justice without economic dynamism is politically fragile.
The deeper challenge lies in the economic base of society. South Africa’s growth model has struggled to generate productivity gains, industrial depth and skills alignment in an era defined by artificial intelligence, platform economies and rapid technological diffusion. A party formed in the era of peasantry and industrialisation now governs in the digital age. This is not a crisis of African nationalism. It is a failure of strategic renewal and organisational design framed around the changes of recent decades.
A structural contradiction
President Cyril Ramaphosa has repeatedly acknowledged the urgency of the employment crisis the state of the nation addresses. Programmes exist but they are not making substantial change. The promise of creating five million jobs stands against more than 16 million people who are unemployed in South Africa. Interventions have been announced but have not been able to address the structural unemployment problem facing the youth of South Africa.
The contradiction is stark. The ANC seeks electoral endorsement from young citizens while presiding over an economy that excludes them. In 1985, the ANC described working youth as the most reliable segment of the revolutionary struggle. Today, many young South Africans are outside both the labour market and the party’s political imagination.
That gap erodes credibility. It also narrows policy space. A country with a large youth cohort but weak growth risks squandering its demographic advantage. Without sustained expansion above population growth, per capita incomes stagnate. Expectations rise faster than opportunity.
Adaptation or decline
If the ANC is to arrest its decline, it must move beyond rhetorical continuity. Race, class and gender remain essential analytical tools. They cannot substitute for a coherent growth strategy. The party faces a stark choice: grow or maintain electoral support, or continue a decline that will erode it further.
A credible renewal would require several shifts: serious industrial policy aimed at labour-absorbing sectors; investment in skills aligned with digital and technological change; access to entrepreneurial finance; reliable energy and logistics; and administrative reform to restore state capability. Political education must address not only liberation history but the constraints of a middle-income economy struggling to reindustrialise.
Finally, and more fundamentally, the party must reopen channels of internal and societal feedback. A movement that once prided itself on mass mobilisation now needs institutional listening. The choice facing the ANC is not between tradition and modernity. It is between adaptation and gradual marginalisation. For the party, the stakes are electoral and existential. For South Africa, they are developmental.
Ashley Nyiko Mabasa is a national executive committee (NEC) member of the ANC Youth League and head of drafting and data analysis, and coordinator for policy, monitoring and evaluation. He holds a double master’s degree from the University of the Witwatersrand in public policy and economic and labour sociology and is currently pursuing an MBA.
The April fuel cliff: Why South Africa’s policy paralysis costs us more than the Middle East war:
On 1 April 2026, South African consumers will face a devastating economic reckoning. The latest projections indicate a historic fuel price surge, with diesel set to rise by more than R8 per litre and petrol by more than R5 per litre. While the immediate trigger is the escalating conflict in the Middle East and a vulnerable rand, the deeper crisis is domestic. We are paying the price for persistent delays by the government to uphold post-Covid-19 promises to comprehensively review the fuel levy structure.
In the wake of the 2022 supply shocks, the ministry of finance and the department of mineral and petroleum resources committed to structural reform to protect consumers from global volatility. Four years later, the promised review remains a mirage. Households and businesses, already operating with limited resilience, are being asked to absorb what is effectively a massive, regressive tax on production and transport.
Unpacking the pump price: What are we paying for?
To understand how to fix the problem, we must first look at the framework that determines what South Africans pay at the pump. The fuel price is not a single cost but an aggregation of distinct components.
The basic fuel price (BFP), which accounts for roughly 45% to 50%, reflects the import parity price, determined by Brent crude, refining margins, shipping and the rand-dollar exchange rate. As a net importer, South Africa is largely a price taker.
Administered taxes make up approximately 30% to 35%. The general fuel levy (GFL) adds over R4 per litre and raises close to R100 billion annually for the National Revenue Fund. The Road Accident Fund (RAF) levy adds another R2.18 per litre to support an entity burdened by systemic mismanagement and structural deficits.
Margins and distribution account for roughly 15% to 20%, covering wholesale, retail, storage and secondary distribution.
This breakdown reveals that a significant portion of the fuel price sits within domestic policy control. The government cannot stop a war in the Middle East but it can intervene in the domestic cost structure.
The levers of state intervention
Three immediate interventions are available.
First, the state can implement a temporary suspension or targeted reduction of the general fuel levy, similar to the reprieve introduced in 2022. Continued reliance on this levy as a general revenue instrument reflects a misalignment between long-term policy planning and the national budget framework.
Second, the RAF levy should be decoupled from the fuel price. Funding a bankrupt accident compensation model through a consumption tax on energy is economically distortive. A shift to a mandatory flat-fee motor insurance model could reduce the per-litre cost by more than R2.
Third, a rigorous audit of the wholesale and retail margin calculation methodology is required to ensure sustainability without passing inefficiencies to consumers.
If the government were to exercise these three levers, the estimated impact could amount to a reduction of between R6.50 and R7 per litre. In an environment where fuel prices may breach R30 per litre, such interventions could neutralise much of the impending April shock.
The fiscal reality and parliamentary mandate
These interventions would affect revenue projections in the 2026-27 budget. Because the National Assembly adopted the fiscal framework on 24 March 2026, any adjustment now requires parliamentary approval. This requirement, however, should not become an excuse for administrative paralysis.
The macroeconomic environment assumed during the February 2026 budget speech has already shifted. The Middle East conflict has altered inflation and growth assumptions, requiring fiscal agility rather than rigid adherence to outdated projections.
Global lessons: How other jurisdictions are responding
South Africa is not the only nation facing geopolitical energy shocks. Other jurisdictions are deploying aggressive interventions that policymakers should consider. Several European economies have implemented windfall taxes on extraordinary energy profits, using the revenue to fund direct relief for households. Some Asian economies are introducing targeted logistics subsidies, particularly for agriculture and freight, to prevent imported inflation from raising food prices. Major economies, including the United States and China, actively use strategic petroleum reserves to increase supply and stabilise domestic prices during periods of acute volatility.
These approaches differ in form but reflect a common principle: when external shocks occur, governments intervene decisively in the domestic price structure.
Beyond periodic shocks
Global price shocks are increasingly recurring. From pandemic-era supply disruptions to geopolitical conflict, external volatility has become structural. Treating each event as a black swan is a failure of macroeconomic governance.
Given the disproportionate effect of fuel costs on transport, food prices and manufacturing, Parliament must urgently hold the executive accountable for commitments made in 2022 to overhaul the fuel price structure. Temporary tax holidays will not resolve the problem; only structural reform will.
The macroeconomic strategy: AfCFTA and regional sovereignty
Temporary relief measures are only short-term responses. South Africa’s long-term protection lies in structural transformation and energy sovereignty. External shocks are becoming the norm in a fragmented global order.
The full implementation of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) offers a pathway to reduce dependence on volatile external supply chains. By matching Nigeria and Angola’s crude oil production with South Africa’s industrial and refining capabilities, the region can localise the energy value chain and reduce exposure to geopolitical disruptions. Developing regional refining capacity and integrating African energy markets would strengthen resilience against global supply shocks.
If structural budget reforms and regional integration continue to be delayed, the country will not only import expensive oil but also deepen poverty and inequality.
Professor Dumisani Jantjies is a lead macroeconomic and fiscal analyst, professor of practice at the University of Johannesburg and chairperson of the African Network of Parliamentary Budget Offices (AN-PBO).
Inside the EFF Free State plot to remove Maluti-a-Phofung mayor:
The provincial secretary of the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) in the Free State, Malefane Msimanga, has accused some of the party’s Maluti-a-Phofung municipality councillors of “spying” for the ANC after a recording emerged following a meeting where the party was plotting to remove mayor Malekula Melato.
The Mail & Guardian understands that the recording was made on Wednesday by one of the people who was in the meeting and sent to senior ANC members in the Thabo Mofutsanyane region.
In a voice note obtained by the M&G, Msimanga instructs EFF councillors on how to vote in the motion of no confidence and discusses positions that the party will seek before supporting Melato’s removal.
“No one must be sick tomorrow. Even if you are vomiting or have a runny stomach, you might as well do it in front of us. If need be, wear a nappy, then after that you can leave. We want this thing,” Msimanga tells councillors.
He emphasises the need to track votes carefully. “As much as we want this thing, we don’t want to be accused of so-and-so selling us out. We are going to organise pens and everyone will have a different colour so that even if we get beaten, we must not claim that someone didn’t vote.”
Msimanga says the party’s secretary-general instructed that Melato needed to go: “The media will be there, creating an impression that there are those who will vote with Malekula. We want Malekula to leave,” Msimanga says.
“This time we are not going to support people for nothing. When they get half, we also want our half. When they appoint a staff member, we also want one as well. We can’t support and come back empty-handed.”
Msimanga also says: “Dieta dia sotheha [we are poor]”.
On Thursday, Melato was ousted in a chaotic motion of no confidence, which saw chairs and tables flying and the ANC walking away from the council meeting. Councillor Paratlane Motloung of the MAP16 Civic Movement was elected as the new mayor.
In the voice note, Msimanga says he is aware that some EFF councillors have been meeting Motloung to discuss the takeover of the municipality.
A female councillor replies: “We spoke about how we will take three MMCs and each MMC gets a secretary.”
Msimanga then asks who they have agreed would take over as mayor in the deal. The councillor replies that it will be MAP16.
The recording also captures discussion about collaboration with other parties, including MAP16, the Freedom Front Plus, Sarko, the African Transformation Movement, the African Content Movement and the Democratic Alliance.
The voice note suggests that some councillors expected 33 votes in favour of removing Melato, while 31 ANC councillors were reported to be opposed. Those speaking in the voice note say the Democratic Alliance will abstain, which became the case at Thursday’s council sitting.
In the recording, those in the meeting say they will have 33 votes, while the ANC will have 31 and that eight ANC members are defying instructions to vote for Melato.
The female councillor says they want to form part of the troika. “The support we gave MAP16 in 2021 did not benefit us. It disadvantaged us so this time we need to share those positions.”
Msimanga says that if MAP16 wants the mayoral position, it must understand that positions will be shared equally. “This thing of fighters being poor is very painful and I’m asking that we should not be factional. Let’s make sure that we try to accommodate as many fighters as possible.”
He also demands that a meeting be held with those they are planning to remove Melato with before the council session begins.
“We must know what is going to happen before we go to vote to avoid conflict. We need to know what we are getting before people are placed. So before we vote, we want a meeting with all of them around 8am.”
Speaking to the M&G, Msimanga acknowledged that it was his voice in the recording and said he was aware of the voice note as it had been sent to him by an ANC member.
He said the party would investigate who recorded the meeting and discipline them, as it was clear that there were ANC spies within their caucus.
Governance was about participation, Msimanga said, and in order to serve people, resources were needed. He added that EFF members had been doing organisational work without funding, to the extent that it was affecting the performance of the organisation.
He added that the party was taking part in government and that it had the right to contest positions of power.
“I don’t know how controversial it is to say we are now participating in government. It is a known fact that we are contesting state power and that we can remove an ANC mayor and install our own mayor.”
ANC insiders said the party would probably challenge the removal of Melato in court, citing what they described as a flawed process in appointing the new mayor. ANC councillors, including the speaker, walked out of the meeting in an apparent attempt to break quorum and prevent the council from voting on the motion.
A councillor in the municipality told the M&G on Thursday that police were called to the council to prevent disruptions after people entered and attempted to disrupt proceedings to stop the vote.
“There are 70 councillors,” said the source. “When the ANC walked out, 36 remained, meaning we still had a quorum. By law, we were allowed to elect an acting speaker from among ourselves because the speaker had left with the ANC councillors. “We elected an acting speaker and the meeting continued. The majority supported the motion to remove the mayor and thereafter a new mayor was elected.”
An ANC source told the M&G that they would probably take the matter to court. “There were 36 inside and we were outside. When there are 36, they meet quorum because quorum is 35. They proceeded to appoint a speaker because we were outside with our speaker.
“The law says when you appoint the speaker or the executive mayor, it is the municipal manager who presides. It cannot be a councillor presiding over another councillor. When they started the process to appoint the mayor, five DA councillors left, meaning that the mayor was appointed without a quorum.”
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