The method behind the madness of the DA’s Moonshot Pact:
“Coalition government” is the hot new phrase for South Africans with their ears to the ground and eyes fixed firmly on the national elections in 2024. For the first time in our short democratic history, the nation has to wrestle with the reality that an outright ANC majority is not necessarily assured.
The ever more imminent notion that the presidency and cabinet will no longer consist of members exclusively from one party, but rather an amalgamation of political actors, raises a myriad questions, not just for voters, but for the parties themselves. Those who are in power, or those who wish to be, are having to tackle this election cycle differently to the way they have in the past. And nowhere were these changes in strategy clearer to see than in the elective federal congress of the main opposition party, the good old Democratic Alliance (DA).
During the DA’s federal conference at the beginning of this month, the party re-elected John Steenhuisen as its leader and outlined how they intend to approach the 2024 elections. It amounted to an open call for parties not named the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) to join forces as one collective opposition unit.
In the words of the man himself, “In my capacity as leader, not only of the DA but of the opposition alternative in this country, our party will immediately initiate a process to form a pre-election Moonshot Pact with like-minded political parties, civil society organisations and civic movements to defeat the ANC, to keep the EFF out, and to inaugurate a new national opposition coalition government.”
The Moonshot Pact seemingly rests on the simple premise that the ANC and EFF need to be kept out of government. The framing that the DA chooses to use when explaining its idea is explicit — they are intending to “unite all the forces in this country that stand opposed to the ANC and the EFF”. The reasons they would choose to set up their strategy in such a way are threefold.
First, they are attempting to capitalise on the voter flight away from the ANC. The writing on the wall is clear — a large portion of South Africans are frustrated and fed up with the ANC and its incompetencies. Our most recent municipal elections made this glaringly obvious, with the ruling party receiving only 45.59% support, the first time in the party’s history that it dropped below 50%.
There will be many people who have historically voted ANC who will not do so in 2024, and the DA is positioning itself in an attempt to assimilate as many of these voters into their constituency as possible. But it recognises the reality that not every voter who leaves the ANC will turn to them, hence the call for a broad-based opposition coalition that could appeal to them.
The characterisation of this coalition as one that exists in opposition to not only the ANC, but the EFF as well, is particularly interesting. Steenhuisen recognises that the established voter base of this apparent coalition is more likely than not to be wary of alliances made with EFF leader Julius Malema and his members and therefore does not want to take the risk of alienating them from this proposed alternative.
He is also aware that the path that involves bringing together an opposition coalition without the EFF is probably easier to construct than one with them in it, based simply on the fact that other parties would be less willing to buy into the idea if the red berets were to be present.
The white and middle-class voters that the Moonshot Pact is attempting to entice to the DA’s side identify with a set of ideologies and parties that are antithetical to those espoused by Malema. The weigh-up that was made by the DA was that they have more to lose by including the EFF in this coalition versus the voter base that they were to gain by having them, and their decision was resoundingly clear.
The DA seems to be hedging their anti-Julius bets on the idea that he and his party will not be perceived as an opposition but rather as a government that would be ANC adjacent. The vicinity of the EFF to the ruling party in the makeup of the members in it, as well as their perceived willingness to work together, is what Steenhuisen is hoping will divert voters away from them as well as making a coalition exclusive of red overalls more appealing.
Second, the DA wants to gain back those individuals who fled the party in search of a more robust opposition, such as the Freedom Front Plus or ActionSA. Chairperson of the Federal Council and the Federal Executive Helen Zille’s blue army is cognisant of the fact that their performance in 2019, which saw their percentage of the popular vote decrease from 22,3% to 20,77%, comes as a result of their voter base turning to alternative opposition parties due to the lack of action on the DA’s part, because they were better able to identify with the message and makeup of another party, and so forth.
What the Moonshot Pact represents is a mechanism that would allow them to accrue the benefits of restoring this group without having to actively convert voters from another party to theirs. Instead of jostling over a small percentage of the population, they can rather use the ties that people have to these parties to bring together a larger electorate who would feel more represented with a government structured this way rather than having to pledge allegiance to a single party entirely.
Finally, there seems to be a tacit admission by the DA that the ANC and EFF are likely to partner up in some way. This means that they can either jockey with each party for the alliance of the other or exclude them from the conversation entirely. Steenhuisen himself seemed to paint this picture in his speech, stating, “We realise that the mission to save our country from the ANC and its Doomsday Coalition with the EFF, is urgent.” With the context that the party is choosing to use being one that has already wedded ANC president Cyril Ramaphosa’s party and its former Youth League leader, the Moonshot Pact sets itself up in a way as to be the other choice in such an arrangement.
While the Moonshot Pact is a clear outlining of political strategy by the country’s largest opposition party, whether or not it is successful can only be determined as the year progresses and we get closer to 2024.
At the moment, the idea that a successful coalition government would not include either the ANC or EFF seems far-fetched. The DA has a year to challenge this narrative. While trying to sell this idea to voters and other opposition parties, the DA is going to have to contend with the monochromatic makeup of its leadership structure as well as attempting to not dissuade other political organisations from the coalition in the process of centring itself within it.
All of this hinges on the combined decline of the ANC and the EFF — that is to say there are a number of dominoes that need to fall before the Moonshot Pact can even be evaluated. But, ultimately, Steenhuisen has staked his political life on it working and therefore the buildup to the next elections is going to focus greatly on how the DA and other opposition parties position themselves in preparation for what is likely to be a historic vote.
The views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Mail & Guardian.
Thabo Bester saga: Nandipha Magudumana’s father granted bail:
Zolile Sikelele, the second accused linked to the prison escape of convicted rapist and murderer Thabo Bester, was on Monday granted bail of R10 000 with conditions in the Bloemfontein magistrate’s court.
Sikelele appeared alongside his daughter, celebrity “doctor” and businesswoman Nandipha Magudumana, and two co-accused, Senohe Matsoara and James Lipholo, on charges related to helping Bester in his escape from the Mangaung maximum security prison on 3 May last year.
They each faced four charges including murder, assisting an inmate to escape and defeating the ends of justice — but the murder charge against Sikelele has been dropped. Matsoara is separately charged with arson and Sikelele with fraud.
The state did not oppose bail for Sikelele.
But Sello Matlhoko, for the state, said bail for the remaining accused when they formally apply for it next month on 3 and 4 May, will be opposed.
Sikelele was granted release on condition that he reports once a week to the Port Edward police station, does not leave the magisterial district of Port Edward without permission and does not have any contact with state witnesses.
He is set to appear in court on 16 May when Bester is expected to be added as accused five in the matter.
Magistrate Mohlolo Khabisi postponed the matter to 3 May.
Magudumana, believed to be Bester’s partner, made her first court appearance in Bloemfontein last week Thursday.
GroundUp recently reported that Magudumana used Bester’s many aliases to book accommodation worth R120 000 in Bloemfontein and Ballito in the weeks leading up to his escape from the maximum security prison last year, which he did by faking his own death.
He and Magudumana were tracked down 11 months later in Tanzania where they were travelling on fake passports.
The Citizen reported that when Bester was detained in Tanzania, documents found in his possession identified him as an American citizen, Tommy William Kelly.
Bester has previously used more than 18 aliases, including TK Nkwana — the name his neighbours knew him by — as well as Piet Timothy and Tom Motsepe.
Last Friday, Home Affairs Minister Aaron Motsoaledi confirmed that Bester does not have a South African identity document, marriage certificate or passport.
“Thabo never registered with any home affairs at any stage. So, the only place where you could find him, as police have said, was in correctional services when he was an inmate. That’s where you’ll find his fingerprints and photo and the South African Police Service’s crime database,” Motsoaledi said.
Strategic autonomy is gaining momentum in Europe:
Once again, France’s President Emmanuel Macron has ignited a controversy on both sides of the Atlantic, this time with his recent remarks that cast doubts on Europe’s allegiance to the United States.
During an interview on his flight back from a three-day state visit to China in early April, the French president shared his perspective on the global order. In exchange with journalists from Les Echos and Politico, Macron voiced his belief that Europe ought to be recognised as a third global power, standing shoulder-to-shoulder with the US and China.
Although this statement affirmed Macron’s well-known desire for “strategic autonomy” in Europe, which emphasises the importance of avoiding reliance on external military and economic actors, it was his comments regarding Taiwan that set off a flurry of criticism and concern from his European and American colleagues. Macron remarked, “Do we [Europeans] have an interest in speeding up on the subject of Taiwan? No. The worst of things would be to think that we Europeans must be followers on this subject and adapt ourselves to an American rhythm and a Chinese overreaction.”
He added that If there was an acceleration of conflict between the US and Chinese duopoly “we will not have the time, nor the means to finance our own strategic autonomy and we will become vassals, whereas we could become the third pole [in the world order] if we have a few years to develop this”.
As expected, there is enough fuel in these remarks to infuriate the China hawks in the West. Although there is nothing “too much new” in his remarks that should suddenly upset his friends in Washington and other European capitals. Macron, for quite some time, has been emphasising the importance of Europe’s sovereignty and strategic autonomy, positing that it is imperative for the continent to assert itself on the global stage. It is the timing and tone of Macron’s comments that have ruffled feathers in the West.
Not surprisingly, the pro-US elements have subjected Macron to severe criticism over his “apparently rebellious” remarks. The Inter-Parliamentary Alliance on China (IPAC) said in a statement that Macron’s comments are “severely out of touch” with sentiment across European leadership. “You do not speak for Europe,” it further said. “The return of geopolitics means that we have to see more clearly who is our ally and who is not. Strong transatlantic relations between Europe and the US are the foundation of our security,”
Similarly, while drawing parallels with the conflict in Ukraine, US Republican Senator Marco Rubio said that if Europe doesn’t “pick sides between the US and China over Taiwan, then maybe we shouldn’t be picking sides either [on Ukraine]”.
Despite such a barrage of criticism, Macron seems determined to resist pressure from pro-American voices at home and abroad. During his trip to the Netherlands last week, Macron reiterated his belief that the European Union must take a stand on key issues independently of the US. Specifically, he identified some crucial areas in which the EU should chart its own course, including trade, competitiveness, and European industry. This bold stance reflects Macron’s commitment to asserting European sovereignty and forging a path that is distinct from that of Washington.
Interestingly, Washington has desisted from directly censuring Macron on his remarks. One obvious reason for such a measured response is the US policymakers are still trying to read the velocity of this new wave of strategic autonomy that has gained momentum in recent months, as more and more European leaders visit Beijing to redefine their relationship.
Macron is not alone in Europe in his quest for strategic autonomy, which is now being tagged with the new equilibrium towards China. Germany, Italy and Spain are among the nations that have thrown their weight behind a robust EU-China relationship, even as the US adopts a more confrontational approach to what it perceives as an increasingly aggressive Beijing. The US is bent upon pressuring the EU to align with its own China strategy, rather than pursue its own interests in its relationship with Beijing.
This pressure is manifested in various ways, such as attempts to prevent European nations from using Huawei’s 5G network equipment and demands for further “decoupling” from China in the semiconductor industry. The remarks made by Macron have been criticised by China hawks in the West for being unhelpful, because they have the potential to weaken US and Japanese deterrence against China in the western Pacific.
The texture of China-EU relations is intricate and Europe also has certain ideological disparities with China, but some of the European leaders have started taking their relationship with China seriously and trying to assert their strategic autonomy in this matter. The prevailing sentiment in the EU, except for few hardliners, is that collaboration with China is essential for mutual benefit, because of the sheer scale of the Chinese market, which boasts the world’s greatest purchasing power.
It seems that the EU recognises that there is no viable alternative to fostering a productive partnership with China. The economic relationship between China and the EU has become increasingly intertwined in recent years. In 2022, their bilateral trade volume reached a staggering $ 847.3 billion, making China the EU’s second-largest trading partner, and vice versa. Moreover, China has emerged as one of the principal sources of tourism for Europe. Prior to the pandemic outbreak in 2019, Chinese tourists spent a whopping €125 billion ($ 136.9 billion) overseas. France alone welcomed 2.2 million Chinese visitors, who generated a total of €3.5 billion ($ 3.8 billion) in revenue. These figures provide a glimpse into the economic effect that China has on the EU.
The recent slew of European leaders visiting China indicates a concerted effort to strike a delicate balance between pragmatic needs and political considerations. Some of the influential members of the EU, particularly France, Germany, Spain and Italy, appear to be seeking a fresh start with China — a “reset”, so to speak.
The current reality demands that the EU and China explore novel paths, while navigating the complex and often contentious issues that have long characterised their relationship. Indubitably, in the recent past, the relationship between the EU and China has been characterised by strained ties and tension. The root of this tension may be linked to US concerns over China’s economic rise, rather than its security implications. In an effort to rally support, the US is attempting to bring the EU into its orbit. But, this “us versus them” mentality is gradually losing steam. After the Pentagon leaks, which have catapulted the Biden administration into a defensive mode, Washington appears to fast losing its clout in dictating the EU
The views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Mail & Guardian.
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