UJ academic awarded Unesco Chair to advance digital inclusion and cultural equity in Africa:
A University of Johannesburg academic has been awarded a Unesco Chair in Cultural Inclusivity and Equity in Digital Media in Africa, following a competitive global process that drew 135 applications to Unesco headquarters in Paris.
Professor Prinola Govenden, based in UJ’s Faculty of Humanities, will lead the chair for the 2026 to 2030 cycle, positioning her within Unesco’s Unitwin network of more than 1 000 chairs across over 120 countries.
Established in 1992, the programme links academic research with policy development and international cooperation, with participating institutions contributing to the identification of emerging issues and the development of governance frameworks across sectors.
The appointment places South Africa within a global network shaping how digital transformation is understood, particularly as debates shift from access to deeper questions of representation, ownership and influence.
The university formally marked the award on Friday through the signing of a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with Communications and Digital Technologies Minister Solly Malatsi, signalling an effort to align the chair’s work with South Africa’s digital policy agenda.
The agreement, signed with vice-chancellor Professor Letlhokwa Mpedi, positions the chair within a broader national push to advance digital transformation, policy development and inclusive innovation.
UJ has framed the initiative as supporting South Africa’s digital diplomacy and leadership on the continent, elevating it beyond a purely academic intervention.
Malatsi said the partnership reflects a shift towards a more collaborative approach to digital development. “It will require partnerships across sectors. Government brings the public mandate and policy direction.
“Universities bring research capacity and critical inquiry. Industry brings investment and innovation, while civil society helps to foster accountability and social legitimacy,” he said.
His remarks situate the chair within a wider policy environment in which the state is increasingly drawing on academic institutions to inform its approach to complex areas such as artificial intelligence, platform governance and data regulation.
Mpedi said the chair reinforces UJ’s role as a leading African institution shaping the future of digital society.
“Our Unesco Chair will contribute innovative research, practical and strategic solutions, as well as policy recommendations for fostering a decolonised and inclusive internet that serves African societies,” he said, adding that the work would focus on both knowledge representation and access within digital systems.
The chair will focus on digital inclusion, cultural representation and equitable access to knowledge in Africa’s evolving digital environment. It will also examine the implications of the Fourth Industrial Revolution and contribute to governance frameworks addressing digital exclusion and the marginalisation of local knowledge systems.
UJ said the initiative has received endorsement at cabinet level, led by Minister in the Presidency Khumbudzo Ntshavheni, underscoring its significance for South Africa’s positioning in global digital governance debates and Africa’s participation in international digital cooperation.
The project is supported by academic partners in China, Canada and Nigeria, reflecting an effort to situate the chair within both global and continental research networks.
The MoU signing also drew participation from industry stakeholders including MTN, Ericsson and the South African Chamber of Commerce and Industry, pointing to cross-sector interest in shaping the direction of digital inclusion.
Govenden said the chair carries a continental mandate aimed at repositioning African voices within global digital systems. “This Chair positions UJ at the forefront of driving research, partnerships and policy that ensure African voices are not only included, but lead in defining global digital narratives,” she said.
She added that the work would challenge assumptions about African audiences as passive recipients of global media, emphasising instead the ways in which users interpret and engage with digital content within specific cultural contexts.
The university is expected to formally launch the chair at a ministerial roundtable in May, focusing on localisation, digital inclusion and equitable knowledge systems across the continent.
SA’s rhinos are ‘more valuable alive than dead’:
The Minister of Forestry, Fisheries and the Environment, Willie Aucamp, has unveiled a new national plan to safeguard South Africa’s rhinos, positioning conservation as both an ecological and economic project and signalling a shift toward broader public and private participation in protecting the species.
Published in the Government Gazette this week, the revised Black and White Rhino Biodiversity Management Plan (BMP) consolidates more than a decade of policy into a single framework, aimed at strengthening coordination and confronting the persistent threat of poaching.
“The Black and White Rhino BMP provides a holistic strategic framework and detailed action plan to strengthen rhino conservation in South Africa,” Aucamp said, adding that it would place efforts “on a renewed and more coordinated course”.
South Africa remains central to global rhino conservation, home to most of the continent’s remaining populations.
The country has previously brought the southern white rhino back from the brink of extinction — from fewer than 50 animals in the early 1900s to tens of thousands at its peak — and now holds a significant share of Africa’s black rhino population.
Today, it is estimated to hold roughly two-thirds of the continent’s rhinos, making its policy choices globally consequential.
But poaching, driven by transnational criminal syndicates supplying demand in Asian markets for traditional medicine and luxury goods, continues to threaten both species.
“Increased demand for rhino horn, which is the driver behind the increased rhino poaching, remains a concern,” the BMP said. “Illegal trade in rhino horn is understood to be driven by crime syndicates operating nationally and internationally, to supply horn for traditional medicine and craft markets in consumer countries mostly in Asia.
“Most of the losses of rhinos to poaching have been experienced in large state-managed protected areas such as Kruger National Park and Hluhluwe-iMfolozi Park, but all areas with rhinos have faced increased poaching pressure since the early years of the 21st century.”
Security costs have surged more than five-fold since 2008, placing strain on both public conservation budgets and private reserves, and underscoring the limits of a protection-only approach. At the same time, smaller, fragmented populations and ongoing habitat pressures are emerging as longer-term risks to the species’ survival.
“At the end of 2022, 32% of black rhino and 61% of white rhino in South Africa were privately or community owned with a trend of increasing private and community ownership over the past two decades,” it said.
Against this backdrop, the new plan marks a shift in thinking: conservation alone is no longer seen as sufficient. Instead, the BMP frames rhinos as both ecological assets and economic drivers, emphasising that their long-term survival depends on broader societal value.
“Efforts within South Africa to develop the biodiversity economy and to ensure that an increased number of South African citizens value rhino, are seen as important in combatting the pressure of poaching on rhinos,” it said.
According to the BMP, coordinated and structured efforts by the government, the private sector and communities are urgently needed to address the rhino poaching challenge.
“The current BMP therefore aims to introduce an approach to rhino ownership and participation in the upstream and downstream economies such that a rhino is more valuable alive than dead.”
The strategy merges earlier plans for black and white rhinos into a single integrated framework, reflecting the overlap in threats and management needs.
It also draws on years of policy development, including high-level government reviews and anti-trafficking strategies that now treat wildlife crime as a form of organised transnational activity rather than isolated conservation offences.
The plan adopts what is described as a “whole-of-society” approach. More than 700 stakeholders, from communities and traditional leaders to private landowners, conservation NGOs and scientists, were consulted in its development, reflecting an effort to broaden both responsibility and benefit. Rhinos are keystone species, as well as a source of national pride and can play a role in fostering social cohesion, according to the revised plan.
This shift is already visible on the ground. A growing share of the country’s rhino population is now held outside state parks, with private and community ownership expanding steadily over the past two decades.
In some cases, these populations now make up the majority of white rhinos and a significant proportion of black rhinos, signalling a structural change in how conservation is financed and managed.
The plan seeks to formalise and scale this trend, linking conservation outcomes with economic inclusion and transformation. It places particular emphasis on ensuring that communities living alongside rhinos derive tangible benefits, a longstanding gap in conservation policy that has often fuelled conflict and undermined local support.
At its core are five priorities: improving biological management of rhino populations, strengthening security and anti-poaching efforts, expanding community empowerment, managing legal and illegal demand for rhino horn and reforming legislation.
These are supported by enabling measures focused on sustainable financing, improved communication and the use of technology and innovation to enhance monitoring and enforcement.
Implementation will initially be led by the department of forestry, fisheries and the environment, with a new national rhino conservation coordination committee set to be established to oversee alignment across government, private sector and civil society actors.
The body is expected to play a central role in improving coordination in a sector often criticised for fragmentation.
“This multi-stakeholder coordinating committee… will play a central role in facilitating the implementation of the BMP and strengthening collaboration across the rhino conservation sector,” Aucamp said.
The plan also incorporates species recovery into broader management strategies, including the potential rewilding of large privately held populations, such as the roughly 2 000 white rhinos recently acquired by African Parks, signalling a move toward integrating private conservation assets into national recovery efforts.
The world needs a new bargain:
There is a quiet but consequential conversation beginning to take shape in global policy circles. As the 2030 deadline for the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) approaches, attention is turning, inevitably, to what comes next.
The instinctive response, particularly within multilateral institutions, is familiar. If the goals are not fully achieved, extend them. If new challenges have emerged, add to them. If ambition appears to be waning, restate it more forcefully.
But there is a growing sense, particularly from the Global South, that this reflex might no longer be sufficient. The real problem with the global development framework is not that it lacks ambition. It is that it lacks credibility.
Over the past decade, the SDGs have provided a powerful normative framework. They have shaped policy discourse, aligned national strategies and created a shared language of development. But as implementation has progressed, a deeper tension has emerged, between what is promised and what is delivered. It is in this gap that trust in the multilateral system has begun to erode.
Nowhere is the tension more visible than from an African vantage point. Africa has consistently been among the strongest supporters of a global sustainability framework. Not because it is ideologically attached to multilateralism but because it has a practical interest in it.
For many African states, global cooperation is not an abstract principle. It is a necessity, whether in climate finance, trade access, technology transfer or debt sustainability.
But the support has never been unconditional. There is a growing recognition that a post-2030 framework cannot simply be an extension of the current one, nor a more elaborate version of it. It must confront a more uncomfortable question: not what we aspire to achieve but how we intend to achieve it.
In other words, the next phase must be less about goals and more about the bargain that underpins them. Because what has become increasingly clear is that the fault line in global sustainability is no longer between ambition and inaction. It is between commitment
and delivery.
Take, for example, the question of actors. It is often assumed that the main divide will be between those who support a global framework and those who oppose it. But the reality is more nuanced.
The strongest supporters of a post-2030 framework will probably remain Africa, much of the Global South and a group of middle powers that see value in a rules-based international order. But their support will be conditional.
They are unlikely to endorse a framework that expands ambition without strengthening delivery, particularly in areas such as climate finance, global taxation, debt restructuring and fair representation in international financial institutions.
At the same time, resistance might not come only from outright sceptics. It might also come from actors who are comfortable with aspirational frameworks but reluctant to engage in binding commitments on implementation. This is where the next phase of global sustainability becomes politically contested.
The question, then, is not whether there will be a framework beyond 2030. It is what form it will take.
From a South African and broader African perspective, the answer is unlikely to lie at either extreme. There is little appetite for a complete reset that risks undoing years of negotiated consensus. But there is equally little support for a simple rollover of the framework.
What is emerging instead is a preference for disciplined revision. Keep the architecture. Retain universality. But strengthen the mechanisms of implementation, finance, accountability, localisation and institutional alignment.
In practical terms, this means fewer new promises and more enforceable delivery.
It also means better alignment between global frameworks and regional agendas. Africa, for example, operates within the strategic horizon of Agenda 2063. A post-2030 global framework that fails to align with such regional visions risks creating parallel policy systems that dilute, rather than strengthen, development outcomes.
But perhaps the most important shift required is not structural but procedural.
The legitimacy of the SDGs was, in part, a product of how they were negotiated, through an unusually inclusive and participatory process. The legitimacy cannot be taken for granted in a more fragmented and polarised global environment. If the next framework is perceived as being state-driven but society-disconnected, it will struggle to command the same level of ownership.
This suggests that the process must be both inclusive and structured. Inclusive, in that it meaningfully engages local government, civil society, research institutions and the private sector. But structured, in that it avoids the common trap of broad participation without political traction.
One possible innovation is a two-track negotiation process, one focused on goals and priorities, the other on implementation arrangements. Too often, the conversations have been separated. Values are negotiated in one room, financing in another. The result is predictable: ambition without delivery.
Reuniting the tracks might be essential to restoring credibility.
Which brings us, ultimately, to the question of alliances, because if there is to be a meaningful post-2030 framework, it would require coalitions that cut across traditional divides.
One such coalition could be built around a simple but powerful idea: fairness. Fairness in climate finance. Fairness in global taxation. Fairness in access to technology. And fairness in representation within global institutions. This is not merely a moral argument. It is a practical one. Without a sense of fairness, there can be no sustained cooperation.
A second, equally important narrative is that of resilience. The global challenges we face, climate shocks, food insecurity, debt distress and technological disruption, are no longer contained within national or regional boundaries. They are systemic. Framing the next development agenda as a form of global risk management, rather than a system of aid, might prove more unifying.
But perhaps the most decisive alliance will be one that is only beginning to take shape, a coalition for delivery.
Led by Africa, supported by middle powers and open to reform-minded partners, such a coalition would shift the centre of gravity in global negotiations. Its message would be simple: no new framework without a new implementation deal. No expansion of ambition without clarity on financing. No new commitments without credible mechanisms of delivery.
This is not a rejection of multilateralism. It is an attempt to restore it. At its core, the challenge facing the global sustainability agenda is not one of vision. It is one of trust. And trust, once lost, is not rebuilt through declarations. It is rebuilt through delivery.
In the end, the world does not need a longer list of goals. It needs a more honest bargain.
Daryl Swanepoel is the chief executive officer of the Inclusive Society Institute and a research fellow at the School for Public Leadership, Stellenbosch University. The article draws on his contribution at the global policy. dialogue on a sustainability framework beyond 2030 convened by the German Institute of Development and Sustainability and the Hamburg Sustainability Conference.
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