Africa’s conservation models struggle to shake colonial yoke:
For wildlife lovers, few debates are as spirited as choosing Africa’s top game reserve. The discussion often hinges on scenic beauty, accommodation options, accessibility, and affordability. But beneath these surface considerations lie deeper questions about how reserves serve local communities, protect endangered species, and steward biodiversity for generations to come.
Inclusive leadership
Undoubtedly, the Maasai Mara in Kenya and Kruger National Park in South Africa dominate any such list. Yet the Mara challenges the Kruger’s fame with what some call the “Big Six” – the familiar Big Five, joined symbolically by the Maasai themselves as co-stewards of the ecosystem. In the Mara, the Maasai are not peripheral actors but co-stars in conservation. Their ancestral bonds to the land, carried across generations, now shape a visitor experience rooted in cultural exchange and community partnership. They welcome mageni (“visitors” in Swahili) into a landscape where wildlife and culture are inseparable threads.
This inclusive leadership transforms the Mara from a protected space policed by rangers into a living landscape co-governed by those who know its rhythms best. The Maasai actively participate in conservation dialogues, revenue-sharing agreements, and education initiatives that nurture coexistence between humans and wildlife. This model sketches a more holistic narrative of the landscape – one where ecological protection, cultural continuity, and economic benefit are intertwined.
Kruger, by contrast, inspires awe through its immense herds and vast biodiversity but is largely experienced without the presence of indigenous custodians. While community-inclusive models exist elsewhere in South Africa – such as in the Kgalagadi, the Kruger’s leadership structure remains comparatively distanced from indigenous participation.
Affordability and access
One of Kruger’s enduring strengths, however, is its commitment to affordability. Its relatively accessible entry fees and a wide range of accommodation options create a more populist model of conservation equity. In contrast to the Mara’s high levies which, though essential to its intensive conservation practices, limit accessibility, Kruger lowers barriers and invites visitors from a broad socio-economic spectrum.
This democratisation of access has built diverse global support networks. It ensures that conservation is not framed as an elite pursuit, but as a shared responsibility. Yet the trade-off is clear: while the Mara’s higher fees sustain deep community integration and support conservation efforts, Kruger’s affordability does not necessarily translate into equivalent local empowerment. Both models succeed at different goals and both reveal the tensions inherent in Africa’s conservation landscape.
Leadership styles and colonial inheritance
From a conservation leadership perspective, the Mara’s communal ethos contrasts sharply with Kruger’s technologically driven and militarised approach. These differences are not arbitrary; they emerge from the distinct colonial and post-colonial trajectories that shaped each region.
Kenya’s context, moulded by British colonial rule, introduced the doctrine that wildlife belonged to the Crown. Paradoxically, this aligned with Maasai cosmology where wildlife is sacred kin rather than property. Post-independence, this alignment facilitated a governance model in which communities were integrated into conservation as custodians and beneficiaries. Revenue-sharing conservancies and community-led patrols reflect a leadership philosophy rooted in partnership rather than enforcement.
South Africa’s context unfolded differently. Apartheid’s violent displacements severed indigenous people from their ancestral lands, while post-liberation privatisation entrenched commercialised conservation. In this environment, community participation became limited, and a transactional approach – fortified fences, armed patrols, and surveillance infrastructure – took hold. These divergent histories explain the leadership divide: East Africa’s blend of indigenous reverence and postcolonial inclusivity versus Southern Africa’s reliance on militarisation as a legacy of exclusion.
“Green militarisation,” though widely critiqued for reproducing colonial logics, persists because decolonial alternatives remain underdeveloped or unsupported. Without structural reform, conservation can easily slip back into colonial patterns, where the land is protected, but the people to whom it belongs are marginalised.
Towards decoloniality
Africa’s conservation challenges cannot be separated from its colonial past. Since the establishment of the first European colony in Cape Town in 1652, both indigenous populations and native wildlife were systematically exploited. The quagga was hunted to extinction; species like the bontebok were driven to the brink; large herbivores vanished from the Renosterveld alongside their predators. These losses reshaped ecosystems and destroyed indigenous livelihoods, an early preview of the ecological inequities still unfolding today.
It is easy to forget that the modern wildlife trade agenda – often marketed as a conservation strategy – draws directly from colonial market-driven exploitation. Recent domestic court rulings permitting wildlife trade risk amplifying poaching pressures and strengthening global trafficking syndicates. These moves fracture the possibility of a unified, pan-African conservation ethos grounded in ecological sovereignty rather than commercial incentive.
Such policies risk misleading Africans into supporting conservation frameworks that replicate colonial extraction under a new banner. Botswana’s recent reopening of trophy hunting, for instance, justifies itself by permitting only 0.3% of elephants to be hunted, yet fails to address the disproportionate impact of removing prime breeding bulls—jeopardising long-term herd viability.
Let us not be tricked
At the recent CITES CoP20 in Samarkand, proposals from several Southern African states to downlist rhinos and reopen the rhino horn trade were decisively rejected. This global refusal signals a growing consensus: the wildlife trade agenda lacks scientific and ethical credibility. Rather than safeguarding species, it risks escalating poaching and deepening the very crises it claims to resolve.
This stance aligns far more closely with ancestral conservation philosophies, reinforcing a decolonised path rooted in respect, reciprocity, and ecological interdependence. If adopted widely, such an ethos could strengthen the Kruger’s ecological resilience, preserve habitat corridors across the continent, and support global climate stability.
The Mara’s wildebeest migration is rightly celebrated as one of the seven natural wonders of the world, while the Kruger’s thundering elephant herds evoke awe of a different magnitude. Both reserves remain essential pilgrimages for wildlife enthusiasts. Yet their futures depend on rejecting the colonial logic embedded in wildlife commodification and embracing leadership models that empower indigenous stewardship.
Let us not be deceived into accepting wildlife trade as conservation. Only by acknowledging – and dismantling – the colonial legacy embedded in African conservation models can the Mara, the Kruger, and countless other parks continue to stand as Africa’s wild vanguards.
Dr. Babar Dharani is a Senior Lecturer at the Allan Gray Centre for Values-Based Leadership at the UCT Graduate School of Business. This article draws on insights from the MBA Leadership course and the MBA core course on Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion.
Kenya’s Ebola case and the politics of contagion:
Ebola has again become a serious public health emergency in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), and the country, with international partners, has been scrambling to contain it. The World Health Organisation (WHO), national authorities and humanitarian agencies have mobilised expertise, supplies and surveillance support. Yet they are doing so in eastern DRC, where insecurity, displacement, weak infrastructure and difficult terrain have long frustrated state authority. The outbreak is therefore more than a medical emergency. It is also a test of whether the world responds to epidemics through genuine solidarity or through the false comfort of distance.
Ebola was first identified in what is now the DRC in 1976 and named after the nearby Ebola River. Its reappearance in the broader region is therefore no surprise. What is especially worrying in the current outbreak is that it involves the Bundibugyo strain, for which there is no licensed vaccine or virus-specific treatment, and that early detection was hampered because initial field tests were not designed to identify it. When surveillance and diagnosis are delayed, tracing and breaking chains of transmission becomes far harder.
The response has been further complicated by resistance in parts of the affected population, driven by fear, misinformation and mistrust of state institutions. Insecurity and attacks on health facilities in eastern DRC have deepened the challenge. Safe burial measures—essential to limiting transmission—have also at times been contested, increasing the risk of further spread.
In such circumstances, many countries have moved to a higher state of alert. Neighboring states have tightened surveillance, and some governments have imposed border or travel restrictions, even though WHO has generally cautioned against blanket closures in favor of more targeted public health measures. The United States, for its part, introduced enhanced screening and channeled some travelers from affected countries through designated airports. States are, of course, entitled to protect their populations. The question is whether they do so in a spirit of international responsibility or in a way that simply shifts risk elsewhere.
That is where Kenya entered the story. In May 2026, reports emerged that the United States, in collaboration with Kenyan authorities, planned to establish a quarantine and isolation facility at Laikipia Air Base for US nationals and others exposed to Ebola in the DRC and Uganda. According to public reporting, the facility would monitor exposed individuals and could temporarily isolate symptomatic patients before transfer for more advanced care elsewhere, including in Europe. What turned the proposal into a political and legal storm was not only the perceived health risk, but the broader sense of secrecy, unequal burden-sharing and inadequate public consultation. At precisely the moment when solidarity was needed to confront the outbreak at source, the arrangement appeared to many as an effort by a powerful country to externalise its biosecurity concerns on to African soil.
Kenya’s High Court then stepped in and temporarily suspended the plan. In conservatory orders issued in late May 2026, the court barred the establishment or operation of the proposed facility and halted the admission into Kenya of persons exposed to or infected with Ebola under the contested arrangement, pending a fuller hearing. The legal challenge turned on constitutional questions of public participation, transparency, health risk and national sovereignty.
The case illustrates, first, the force of law in a democratic state. That matters for Kenya. An executive cannot enter into arrangements with far-reaching implications for public health and sovereignty without transparency, consultation and accountability. But the case also prompted wider scrutiny of a decision that many saw as an attempt by one country to insulate itself from a global health threat that demanded shared responsibility. It raises a larger question, particularly in the post-Covid era: is this to be the model for future pandemics—successive rings of containment around the epicenter, calibrated less to defeat the outbreak than to reassure those who are geographically distant but politically influential?
Quarantine can be a legitimate public health instrument. But if it is to command trust, it must also be framed by solidarity. The American proposal might have been received differently had it been transparently embedded in a broader international response—one that served not only foreign personnel, but also strengthened local and regional preparedness, expanded treatment capacity and contributed directly to outbreak control in the DRC itself. That would have reflected not merely a logic of defensive containment, but one of genuine partnership.
The Kenyan court’s decision should be read well beyond Kenya. Across Africa, governments will need to negotiate such arrangements with greater care, more transparency and a firmer sense of constitutional discipline and national interest. Emergency agreements concluded in haste can set troubling precedents. On matters as sensitive as epidemic response, they should reflect a simple principle: global health security cannot rest on the quiet transfer of risk to those with the least power to refuse it.
Are Africans welcome at the World Cup?:
This year’s World Cup, which begins on June 11 across the United States, Mexico, and Canada, features 10 African teams, more than ever before.
But despite African success on the soccer field, many fans from African countries do not feel welcome at the World Cup. FIFA’s weak response to the US government’s immigration crackdown, which includes travel restrictions targeting dozens of African nations, means many African soccer fans and journalists are unable or unwilling to visit the US.
US President Donald Trump has a history of disparaging Africans. The Trump administration’s immigration policies have mirrored this prejudice: his administration imposed full or partial bans on travel to the US for citizens from 39 countries, including 26 in Africa.
Citizens from all African countries facing partial visa bans, as well as from another 16 countries across the continent, may have to pay a visa bond of up to $ 15,000, returned once US authorities confirm they have exited the country. Trump has also suspended the US refugee admissions program, which resettled more than 100,000 refugees including 34,000 Africans in 2024. White Afrikaners from South Africa are currently the only category of refugee eligible for resettlement in the US.
African immigrants, refugees, and asylum seekers already present in the US, as well as Black Americans generally, have also suffered from the Trump administration’s immigration crackdown.
Federal security forces, including agents from Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), have arbitrarily and sometimes violently detained people across the country, including targeting Latino, Black, and other communities of color. Somalis and other Africans were among the targets of the US government’s campaign of terror and intimidation against immigrants in Minnesota this past winter, which included arrests of people with recognized refugee status.
The Trump administration has also deported African and other asylum seekers and migrants to African states that are not their countries of origin – including Cameroon, Eswatini, South Sudan, and Equatorial Guinea – where they are at risk of harm or other rights violations, including arbitrary detention and forced repatriations.
In August 2025, a South African journalist, at a meeting in Kenya to discuss the World Cup, urged FIFA president Gianni Infantino “to make sure that Africa and all the other people of the world do not feel outcast, do not feel like they are being made second-class citizens in a world where equality should prevail.” Infantino responded, “Be positive…you will see there will be a great, great celebration of the greatest FIFA World Cup ever.”
African journalists, however, from the countries targeted by Trump’s travel bans face the same visa restrictions as fans. On June 5, the International Sports Press Association wrote to FIFA to raise concerns about “countless” and “unacceptable” cases of denied entry visas for reporters, including African journalists specifically.
FIFA also recently confirmed that Somali referee Omar Abdulkadir Artan, one of Africa’s top referee of 2025, will be “unable to train and officiate at the Fifa World Cup 2026” after he was denied entry to the US.
The global football governing body has so far done very little to tackle the impact on fans and workers of the US government’s problematic immigration policies. The US government has said it will waive visa bonds for some ticketholders using FIFA PASS, an expedited visa appointment system for the World Cup ticket holders.
But participation in the program provides no way around other travel bans and visa restrictions. Exceptions to the travel bans provided for World Cup athletes and coaches do not apply to fans or other workers.
Neither FIFA nor the US government have responded to calls for an “ICE Truce,” which would protect immigrants in the US from abuses by eliciting a public guarantee from federal authorities to refrain from immigration enforcement at World Cup games and venues.
African music megastars Tyla and Rema are scheduled to perform at the World Cup’s opening ceremony in Los Angeles. But while African music and soccer are welcome at the tournament, many African fans and journalists, it would seem, are not.
Ahmar Maiga is the founder and executive director of Young Players Protection in Africa
Vincent Sima Ole is a senior program and sport and human rights coordinator at Human Rights Watch
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